Iraq: politics through conflict

Iraqi army personnel and people gather at the site of a car bomb attack in the city of Kut, 150 km (93 miles) southeast of Baghdad on July 29, 2013. (Photo: Reuters)

The latest bombings in Baghdad and other cities show how politics in Iraq has become increasingly nasty. Although Iraq has never been a fully stable country since its foundation in 1923, it had never reached a level to be called a conflict.
After the American invasion in 2003, some political players had driven the country toward a devastating sectarian conflict; undoubtedly, the Americans have an important role in strengthening the sectarian identity since the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003. Sunnis that were ruling Iraq for decades felt neglected because Iraq's majority Shiites started to consolidate their power.
So Sunnis started the armed struggle to get back their glory, or at least poison political life; this struggle was based on revenge. Later, when the first elections took place in 2005, Sunnis boycotted it; they felt yet more isolated. Then, when their anger peaked, they bombed the Shiite icon, the AlImamayn Al-Askariyyan mosque, in Diyala province. By then, the Shiites decided to seek revenge as the ordinary Shiites' anger peaked as well.
From 2006, a bloody sectarian conflict has torn the whole country. The prospect of a solution seemed murky, and when the politicians became disenchanted, Iraq returned to medieval times. A fragile deal was signed between power-thirsty politicians as the security got better. But the tutelage of regional and international powers, and the sectarian-oriented beliefs of the Iraqi politicians may drive the country to another, worse sectarian conflict whose outcome this time might be far more disastrous. The already crisis-prone Iraqi political system is run by politicians who are implementing external agendas; when it is needed, they are shaking the political life with bombings and turning it into a religious and ethnic conflict. The recent bombings in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq are entirely linked to the political standoff between Shiite Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and his Sunni and Shiite rivals. The bombings in Iraq have become a trump card that all politicians are using as the easiest way to get what they want or at least not to allow other parties to set their political agenda. 

This article first appeared on Today's Zaman - here:
http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=322235

Erbil -- the next Dubai or İstanbul?

Erbil, one of the most ancient cities in the world, around 50 miles east of Musil, is the regional capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq. Erbil, with its 1.5 million population, is one of the most rapidly growing cities in the Middle East in both its economy and the tourism sector with investments exceeding 14 billion dollars so far in 2013. Most of these investments come from neighboring Turkey, the KRG's biggest economic partner.   

Now, in the KRG, there are debates about which city Erbil should consider as a role model as Masoud Barzani, president of the autonomous region, more than a few times mentioned Dubai as a role model for the city. “We will make Erbil like Dubai,” Barzani stated. However, one who knows the nature of both cities can easily realize how far this dream is from being reached for various reasons. In addition, apart from the skyscrapers, there is nothing much to take from Dubai.
İstanbul, now in the global spotlight as a center of tension because of the Gezi park protests, could be a good role model for Erbil, for various reasons. Here are some: When we wake up in the morning, we will wash our face with Turkish soap, then we will eat Turkish cheeses with some Turkish breads. After that, we will change our clothes, wearing a Turkish-brand shirt and jeans. Then while going to work, along the road we will see all these new Turkish investment projects. After arriving at our office, we will sit on a Turkish chair surrounded by other Turkish furniture. Later, we will drink Turkish coffee. Then, we will do our job with Turkish-made pen and paper in hand. After some hard work, we will finish our job and go to a Turkish restaurant with our friends to have lunch; there we will be delighted by hearing some Turkish music. Then, home again after a tiring day, we will have a dip in a relaxing Turkish bath. After that, we will sit on a Turkish sofa and listen to news on a Turkish-brand television. At night, we will go to a Turkish shopping center with our family and buy some Turkish products. Later, after finishing our shopping, we will go home to a building made with Turkish tools by Turkish workers. Then, we'll feel sleepy and go to our Turkish-made bed, then have a sweet dream about going to İstanbul for a vacation.
İstanbul is a success story, mixing modernity with its rich authenticity, much ahead of Dubai in all sectors. While Erbil is already becoming the next İstanbul, why it should look to Dubai as a success story?

This article first appeared on Today's Zaman - here:
http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=318004&columnistId=145

Sunni insurgency: Iraq's dissolution and beyond

Iraq's political dilemma has deepened yet further with the bloody clash between the Iraqi Shiite-dominated army and the Sunni protesters in Hawija in southern Kirkuk, that later spread to elsewhere in the Sunni region. However, that was expected. Inspired by the Syrian revolution, demonstrations in the predominately Sunni cities in central and northern Iraq started almost five months ago against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's anti-Sunni policies. They have made seven demands, but the demands have fallen on deaf ears. Now chaos and rebellion spreads in many of the Sunni cities in the northern and central parts of Iraq. Does that signal the beginning of Iraq's dissolution? Or does it suggest the beginning of a sectarian conflict beyond Iraq?              

The Sunni rebellion against the Shiite-led government of Mr. Maliki that was sparked last week has multi-dimensional consequences for the future of Iraq, the Syrian revolution, regional alliances and the sectarian conflict.          
It can be said that the demonstrations in the Sunni cities that began in early January were the first step toward a Sunni region in the central and northern Iraq. But the clashes between demonstrators and the Iraqi army could be considered a bolder step from Sunnis toward forming their region after becoming hopeless about Mr. Maliki's policies that have especially targeted Sunnis, including their leaders. Now, chaos and rebellion are all over the Sunni cities including Musil, Sunnis' biggest city. Sunni fighters are mainly tribal members are trying to establish a de facto Sunni region. Then that means the three-region solution is slowly becoming real, which would seemingly lead to the dissolution of a country called Iraq that has never been fully integrated.          
Here, eyes cannot be blind to the regional powers' role in what's happening in the Sunni cities. A report leaked by Kurdish media in northern Iraq shows that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), in line with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is pushing on Sunnis to seize Mr. Maliki in Baghdad and later topple him. Some other reports suggest that Sunni regional powers are pushing Sunnis to build their own region to help the Syrian opposition to attack from Iraq, because most of Iraq's border with Syria is from Anbar and Musil, which are Sunni cities. This is also because they think Mr. Maliki cannot be toppled without overthrowing the Syrian dictator.          
Recent developments in the Sunni region of Iraq have a strong linkage with the Syrian revolution. Protest in the Sunni region first started in Anbar; this city is neighbor to the Syrian city of Dir al-Zur, one of the most anti-Assad cities in Syria. So, the demonstration culture has crossed from the Syrian border to Iraq. If one observes, it can easily be found that the demonstrations that have now developed into armed rebellion have been organized and run just like Syria's.          
What matters most here is the sectarian image that the clash between protesters and the Iraqi government has; that signals another round of sectarian conflict, but what is different this time is that it's very likely to cross the border and engulf the whole region, as we already have it in neighboring Syria.          
To avoid the worst scenario, regional powerhouses, especially Iran and Turkey, should do more to ease the tension and push both sides to stop the violence. Also both Sunni protesters and Mr. Maliki should give up on some of their stubbornness and compromise. However, if Sunnis, like Kurds, want to have their own state, they should be allowed to do so: After all, no one should be forced to live in a state that is already suffering from instability; otherwise, the oblivion will become despair.

This article first appeared on Today's Zaman - here:
http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=313896&columnistId=145

Turkey's KRG policy: Is it a healthy one?

KRG President Massoud Barzani (L) greets Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the AK Party congress. (Photo: AA, Kayhan Özer)

The relations between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq are shining nowadays, thanks to economic cooperation and Turkish investment in flourishing cities of the KRG. The energy partnership is expected to boost the ties between the two parties still further. But the Turkish government's political relationship with leaders of northern Iraq seems to be more personal than with the region's authorities as a whole; that's why it lowers the expectations for a long and sustainable relationship between Ankara and the KRG. To avoid that, Turkey should change its policy toward the KRG to a more comprehensive one that embraces all parties of the region.

The ties between Turkey and the KRG have a young history, starting just three years ago. But they have been improving very rapidly. However the relations have mostly remained only with Massoud Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani's Kurdistan Democracy Party (KDP), which controls less than half of the Kurdish region. However, Turkey's relationship with the other parties is very limited. Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls the other part of the KRG, is closer to Iran, and makes up 50 percent of the cabinet. Also, the places that are under the PUK's control have more oil and natural gas than those under the KDP's control, and natural resources are one of the main factors driving the relations between the two parties. This is why many inside the region think that relations between Turkey and the KRG are more personal than the ones between the two national governments. Turkey should seek stronger ties with the PUK because without them, she cannot build an energy partnership with the KRG. Even though Turkey and the PUK already have ties and a high delegation from the PUK visited Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last month, these ties are still far weaker compared with the ones with the KDP.

Not only that, if Turkey wants a sustainable partnership with the KRG, it should expand its ties to include the opposition as well, especially the main opposition Gorran movement. The Gorran Movement for Change, which holds 23 percent of the Kurdish parliament, is expected to perform better in the upcoming election, anticipated to be held in August. Gorran is particularly expecting to win in the PUK-held oil-rich territories, which should cause concern for Turkey. Last year, the Turkish government invited Nawsherwan Mustafa, leader of the Gorran movement, to visit Ankara, but that has never happened. While Gorran's relationship with Iran is well established, this could change because this movement is a liberal force; it has no ideological connection to Iran, only shared interests. There is also a possibility that both the PUK and Gorran will make a coalition government without the KDP. Turkey's relations with the KRG will decline at the expense of Iran's because its ally, the KDP, will no longer be the governing party.

Given the fact that Turkey supports democratic change in the region, it should also do the same in the KRG, which suffers from weak democratic institutions and corruption. It should press the ruling parties to make some reforms to consolidate democracy and human rights. If Turkey does those things, then it can secure the supply for its energy-hungry economy with the KRG's huge amount of oil and natural gas.

This article first appeared on Today's Zaman - here:
http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=312083

Iraqi Kurds welcome Öcalan’s message

A wave of reactions, mostly positive, followed Abdullah Öcalan’s call for cease-fire and withdrawal of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters from Turkish territories to northern Iraq, which also raised hope for ultimate peace in Turkey’s Southeast.

Kurdish administrations in northern Iraq that enjoy strong alliance with Turkey welcomed Öcalan’s message. Massoud Barzani, the president of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, welcomed the message in a statement and showed his support for it. “This is what we have been calling for for a long time: the settlement of the Kurdish issue through political means not military ones,” Barzani said in the statement. The Kurdish president added, “Peace talks should be considered as a strategic process, not as a tactical or a temporary one.”

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) also sees Öcalan’s message as a positive one. “The KRG welcomes and supports any step from both Kurds and the Turkish government to solve the Kurdish issue through peaceful and political means,” it said in a statement, also calling on both sides not to let anyone sabotage this peace process. 

Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has also shown its support for the message, saying, “We hope Turkey’s new constitution will give equal rights to Turkey’s all ethnic groups.” The PUK’s statement also hoped for an agreement between Turkey’s AKP and the PKK in Turkish parliament.

The main opposition parties in the KRG also supported the message. Nawshirwan Mustafa, leader of the Gorran Movement for Change, an opposition group in the KRG, was among the crowd in Diyarbakır on March 21 when Öcalan’s message was read out. The Kurdistan Islamic Union, another opposition party that is considered to be ideologically close to the AKP, also showed its full support for the message, saying, “We hope everyone sees this message as a turning point in solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey.” The statement also thanked both AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkish President Abdullah Gül that are “engineers of the peace talks.”

Many Kurdish intellectuals and influential figures also welcomed the message and considered it an important change in Abdullah Öcalan’s and PKK’s mentality.

Meanwhile some ultra-nationalist Kurds especially those living in Europe condemned the message and accused Öcalan for betraying the Kurdish struggle for independence.

Published here earlier:
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Is the rise of political Islam a purely negative phenomenon?*

Two years after the outbreak of what has come to be known as the Arab Spring, the boldest outcome by far has been the rise of political Islam; that’s mainly because Islamic organizations have been among the only forums in which average citizens can express themselves or participate actively in the lives of their communities. However, the story of political Islam hasn’t started here, it has much older record; the wave has first started in Iran, Turkey later Iraq, way before the Arab Spring. Accordingly, the political Islam has been extremely varying from a place to another. Hence, the performance of political Islam has been as diverse as the rainbow, from the dogmatic fundamentalism of Afghanistan’s Taliban to much-praised liberal-oriented the justice and development party in Turkey; that being said, the political Islam is not a purely negative phenomenon.

Islamists versus Islamists
Interestingly all the Middle Eastern powerhouses govern by religious forces from Turkey to Iran, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. However their models are notably diverse, for instance Turkey’s incumbent the Islamic-leaning justice and development party, more commonly known by the initials A.K.P. has been called by many scholars as a new model of political Islam. They have been called Liberal Islamists, liberal in the sense that it respects people’s liberty to choose between Islam and non-Islam, between piety and vice. This liberal experiment of Turkey’s ruling the A.K.P. is becoming a model for Islamist parties in the Arab Spring countries that they already won elections in both Egypt and Tunisia and formed governments. “If Turkey succeeds in that liberal experiment, and drafts its new constitution-in-the-making accordingly, it can set a promising example for Islamist-led governments in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere” Mustafa Akyol has written in a piece on The New York Times.
However in the same time, there is the model of Iran, where there is authoritarian theocracy with some elements of modern democratic states such as frequent periodic elections. Furthermore, there is also the model of Saudi Arabia where there is a mix of theocracy and tradition. This is a more totalitarian model of theocracy than Iran’s because of the strong presence of traditions that limit civic freedoms further more. Moreover, the Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood that found in 1928, but gained power in 2012 could be considered another and different model of political Islam. The Economist in an article that published in late 2011 defines the Muslim Brotherhood as “professing a fairly moderate version of Islam, the Brotherhood is known for its political savvy as well as its resilience and discipline.” This trend that could be considered the widest in the Islamic world is called: democratic Islamism. But, this model might not be liberal like Turkey’s because as Fareed Zakaria says in his book The future of freedom: Illiberal democracy at home and abroad “there are illiberal democracies, too, where the majority’s power is not checked by constitutional liberalism, and the rights and freedoms of all citizens are not secured”. Also in Egypt another type of political Islam is in emergence that is closer to Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabis. This trend has been called Salafism. They seek to purge the faith of modern masses and impose literal interpretations of dogma. 

Is the rise of political Islam purely negative?
Perhaps the negative image of political Islam is not based on nothing; many Islamists have a notorious history, particularly the ones that ruled before the Arab Spring with exception of Turkey. The Islamic models of Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan and somehow Hamas in Gaza have been considered failure especially with the lenses of the western democratic liberals. However despite the negative commonplace on political Islam that has become stereotype in the west, and in many Islamic countries equally, the rise of political Islam is certainly not purely negative.
A major positivity of the rise of political Islam is engagement of Islamists in the democratic system, while they have been for long perceived as opponents of it. In a country like Egypt, the ultra-Orthodox Salafis until very recently were denouncing participation in the elections or representation in the parliament, but now they have the second biggest share in the parliament. This could be considered an impressive change in the mentality of this fundamentalist group that has picked the ballot box rather than the gun barrel. Even further moderation in their ideology is expected as they face the responsibility of governing. 
The rise of political Islam has also become a strong setback for Jihadists, particularly Al-Qaeda. Many religious youths in the region has joined Jihadist group because they have seen no hope for peaceful change, and they have been oppressed, while it is believed that Islamists will become more moderate when they are not oppressed. Therefore, the rise of Islamists within the new democracies in the region is an automatic setback for aggressive Jihadists. Safwat Abdel-Ghani, the leader of an Egyptian Salafist group says, “Al-Qaeda has not been destroyed by the ‘war on terror' but by popular revolutions that made it unnecessary”.
Another good sign of the rise of political Islam is the diversity. In spite of their landslide popularity in many countries in the region, the range of Islamists can be a guarantee of democratic systems in those countries. Things would be more concerning if Islamists were united in a single worldview. A good example here would be Iraq. With the current Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, an Islamist, is consolidation power that threatens the democratic system in Iraq, his opponents that are mainly Islamists are moving to fade off his dream to establish another autocracy, in another form, in Iraq. Now if all Islamists were united in one worldview, the return of autocracy was much more likely. Here, Islamists are becoming guardians of democracy because pluralistic democracy can protect their interest.
A wave of conservatisms is surrounding the Middle East and elsewhere. Islamists can contain them, which is good, because otherwise they might not be controlled. In a country like Egypt only Islamists can reflect the mass, as an overwhelming majority is conservative. Here one can be optimistic, as Islamists are reflecting the majority, otherwise the option for many would be terror.
More positive than all what have been mentioned above is that Islamists can be even more democratic than seculars as in the case of Turkey. The ruling A.K.P. has swept the country toward further democratization since gained power a decade ago. The minorities rights that have always been a black stain on Islamists faces have been considerably widen for Kurds, an ethnical group, and Alevis, a secular sect of Islam. Furthermore political liberalism has been flourished and the country is expected to liberalize further with a new constitution is in the making.
With the rise of political Islam, science is also expected to come back, after centuries of stagnation. In countries like Egypt and Tunisia there are promising reforms in the way university posts are filled. People are being elected, rather than appointed by the regime. Even the other countries of the region that rules by Islamists are performing much better in science than other non-Islamic countries. According to a report by the Economist research spending in Turkey increased by over 10% each year between 2005 and 2010, by which year its cash outlays were twice Norway’s. In the category of best-regarded mathematics papers, Iran now performs well above average, with 1.7% of its papers among the most-cited 1%. 

The late rise of political Islam is gradually reducing the widely negative image on Islamists. The relative success of Turkish model of liberal Islamism may liberalize the other moderate Islamists in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the region as well. Yet, one cannot be in total optimism as there is fear that the soft and moderate version of political Islam may witness failure, in this case the re-rise of the violent Jihadists is expected. After all the rise of political Islam is still in the making, it has not been completed; that’s why positivity or negativities of it may unpredictably change.

* This is a university essay, but I have rewritten it in a less academic form.

Shedding Light on the Paris Killing Mystery

Abdulla Hawez 

Many scenarios have been put forward to explain the recent murders of the three Paris-based Kurdish activists (Sakîne Cansiz - Fîdan Dogan - Leyla Soylemez), all of whom were members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party,­ more commonly known by the initials PKK.  Most of these explanations were overly hasty and unconvincing, with a few exceptions.  Here I show why neither Turkish ultra-nationalist, nor a radical wing inside the PKK carried out the assassinations; but an external force that wants to derail the peace talks committed it.

The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan stated a couple hours after the incident that “it might be an internal conflict”. Mr. Erdogan’s evidence is that “the killer or killers had gotten into a building with a security door code, and had somehow managed to get into the office without breaking down the door”. In reality, there is very thin evidence to support this. According to witnesses “the building where assassination took place was not that difficult to access as claimed” says Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a journalist who traveled to Paris after the incident. “The assassination was professionally planned” he adds. It seems to be planned and done by a powerful intelligence agency. There are speculations that they opened door to killers. Killers might have followed them in.

It is true that the PKK contains various wings. It is also true that some are more radical than others. However, unlike all previous occasions, all the factions of the PKK are in agreement on the present negotiations with the Turkish government, simply because the negotiator is Abdullah Öcalan. Mr. Öcalan is the pillar that unites all the factions of the PKK and the other organizations related to it. The hunger strike that lasted more than 60 days in the fall of last year showed how powerful he is. According to a leader of the PKK who spoke with me on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the current situation, Sakîne Cansiz, the main target of the assassination, was one of the consensus-building leaders who had worked to balance relations between the PKK’s different wings. Some Turkish media outlets are claiming that Cansiz was killed because she was “pro- peace talks”, without acknowledging that all the PKK factions are presently pro- peace talks, because of the involvement of Mr. Öcalan, whom they see as their spiritual father.

For the first time, roughly all the major players in Turkish politics agreed on the necessity for negotiations between the Turkish government and the imprisoned leader of the PKK. Even the Turkish nationalists agreed that it was time to tackle the decades-long Kurdish issue: this was not because they wished to embrace the PKK, or even the current government, but simply because there are serious threats to Turkey’s unity at present; more, in fact, than at any previous time. All Turkish political factions are aware of this. The rapid developments in neighboring Syria and Iraq, especially regarding the case of the Kurds in these countries, are threatening Turkey. Furthermore, this year was very tough for the Turkish army, as hundreds of them have been killed in some of the bloodiest encounters with the PKK since 1991.  Interestingly, the Turkish ultra-nationalists, who have a lavish record of assassinating Kurdish dissidents inside Turkey, have not much that record abroad -- even when they were much stronger than now. The Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is the main opposition party and includes as its members much of the shadowy world of the notorious Turkish "deep state", has notably welcomed the negotiations.  

According to a Wikileaks cable, more than five years ago the American ambassador to Turkey, Ross Wilson, advised the Turkish government to limit the financial resources of the PKK in Europe by arresting both Reza Altun and Sakîne Cansiz. Altun had been one of the main money collectors for the PKK in Europe and was jailed in France in July 2006, and later exiled to Iraqi Kurdistan.  Cansiz, one of the three targets in the Paris incident was according to the US ambassador’s report the agent responsible for the purchase of the PKK’s weapons. She was also, according to Turkish media, one of the PKK negotiators in the Oslo talks between the Turkish intelligence agency and the PKK. She was arrested Germany on the 27th of August 2007 and held for forty days before being released by the court of Hamburg.

The main target of the Paris incident is Sakîne Cansiz; the other two were in the wrong place and in the wrong time. This scenario seems unlikely because Cansiz had supported the peace talks and disarmament of the PKK if the talks succeeded. If the Wikileaks wire proves correct, the Turkish government might have been trying to send multiple messages by ordering the hit. First, to show the PKK it’s capability to hit hard even if the negotiations were to fail. Second, to force the PKK to accept difficult concessions. Additionally, it may have had the purpose of widening the differences inside the PKK by persuading some portion of its members as well as the world at large that the Paris incident was an internal conflict over the peace talks with the Turkish government.

The most probable scenario is that an external force committed the assassinations. This scenario is the strongest amongst all scenarios for several reasons. This is the first time that both the Turkish and Kurdish sides have been seriously engaging in peace talks that might finally disentangle the Kurdish question. The only barrier that has blocked Turkey’s development has been the Kurdish issue. Solving this problem would be a big step for Turkey in terms of economy, foreign policy and joining the EU. This would automatically be a setback for Turkey’s regional rivals, especially those who have Kurdish minorities; namely Iran and Syria. Mr. Erdogan once said that terrorism has cost Turkey more than 400 billion dollars, in spite of the lost of many human resources. We can see that the region is passing through a crucial period that might witness the remapping of the political landscape. With Mr. Erdogan’s government backing the Syrian opposition, the Paris incident might be well linked with the events in the neighboring Syria. We should consider that previous week the Syrian wing of the PKK fought with the regime forces for the first time. This was a very important development as the PKK had been allied with the regime before. Iran, an important regional powerhouse, is also concerned. If the Kurds in Turkey finally find peace, the Kurds of Iran, who compromise 10% of the population, will probably be motivated to seek autonomy, especially as a growing number of them have been hanged lately. Additionally, the PKK that once was part of the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus axis, might distance itself from them if the peace talks in Turkey succeed. Therefore the peace talks contain multiple negative possibilities for Iran. Aside from all this, we should consider that Iran has a long and notorious history of foreign assassination, from the famous Kurdish politician Abdul Rahman Qasimlo to Sadiq Sharafkandi and Fazil Rasul, both Kurdish politicians. There can be more than one message if the culprit is Iran. First, to the PKK leaders, that nowhere will be safe or peaceful for you, even if you get an agreement with the Turkish government to disarm and reside in Europe. Second, to the Turkish government, that they are capable of poisoning any efforts to reconcile with adversaries on Turkish soil: not while the Turkish state supports the toppling of Iran’s most important ally, the Syrian regime.

Why Paris? For two reasons: because they wanted to target Sakîne Cansiz, the PKK’s most controversial leader, both the Turkish government and the PKK can be accused of murdering her, this way Iran would be distanced from the case. The second reason: because she was based in Paris because Turkey’s ties with France had been deteriorating over the French parliament’s recognition of the Armenian genocide, which Ankara denies.

Whoever is the perpetrator, it should be denounced. Those who carried this action out are dark forces who want bloodshed to continue, and don’t want a prosperous Turkey to emerge from a lasting peace.