Sunni insurgency: Iraq's dissolution and beyond

Abdulla Hawez

In this Tuesday, April 23, 2013 file photo, Iraqi army soldiers stage on the outskirts of Hawija, 150 miles (240 kilometers) north of Baghdad, Iraq. Iraqi army has been fighting with Sunni insurgents over the past week.(Photo: AP, Hadi Mizban)

Iraq's political dilemma has deepened yet further with the bloody clash between the Iraqi Shiite-dominated army and the Sunni protesters in Hawija in southern Kirkuk, that later spread to elsewhere in the Sunni region. However, that was expected. Inspired by the Syrian revolution, demonstrations in the predominately Sunni cities in central and northern Iraq started almost five months ago against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's anti-Sunni policies. They have made seven demands, but the demands have fallen on deaf ears. Now chaos and rebellion spreads in many of the Sunni cities in the northern and central parts of Iraq. Does that signal the beginning of Iraq's dissolution? Or does it suggest the beginning of a sectarian conflict beyond Iraq?              

The Sunni rebellion against the Shiite-led government of Mr. Maliki that was sparked last week has multi-dimensional consequences for the future of Iraq, the Syrian revolution, regional alliances and the sectarian conflict.             
It can be said that the demonstrations in the Sunni cities that began in early January were the first step toward a Sunni region in the central and northern Iraq. But the clashes between demonstrators and the Iraqi army could be considered a bolder step from Sunnis toward forming their region after becoming hopeless about Mr. Maliki's policies that have especially targeted Sunnis, including their leaders. Now, chaos and rebellion are all over the Sunni cities including Musil, Sunnis' biggest city. Sunni fighters are mainly tribal members are trying to establish a de facto Sunni region. Then that means the three-region solution is slowly becoming real, which would seemingly lead to the dissolution of a country called Iraq that has never been fully integrated.             
Here, eyes cannot be blind to the regional powers' role in what's happening in the Sunni cities. A report leaked by Kurdish media in northern Iraq shows that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), in line with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is pushing on Sunnis to seize Mr. Maliki in Baghdad and later topple him. Some other reports suggest that Sunni regional powers are pushing Sunnis to build their own region to help the Syrian opposition to attack from Iraq, because most of Iraq's border with Syria is from Anbar and Musil, which are Sunni cities. This is also because they think Mr. Maliki cannot be toppled without overthrowing the Syrian dictator.             
Recent developments in the Sunni region of Iraq have a strong linkage with the Syrian revolution. Protest in the Sunni region first started in Anbar; this city is neighbor to the Syrian city of Dir al-Zur, one of the most anti-Assad cities in Syria. So, the demonstration culture has crossed from the Syrian border to Iraq. If one observes, it can easily be found that the demonstrations that have now developed into armed rebellion have been organized and run just like Syria's.             
What matters most here is the sectarian image that the clash between protesters and the Iraqi government has; that signals another round of sectarian conflict, but what is different this time is that it's very likely to cross the border and engulf the whole region, as we already have it in neighboring Syria.             
To avoid the worst scenario, regional powerhouses, especially Iran and Turkey, should do more to ease the tension and push both sides to stop the violence. Also both Sunni protesters and Mr. Maliki should give up on some of their stubbornness and compromise. However, if Sunnis, like Kurds, want to have their own state, they should be allowed to do so: After all, no one should be forced to live in a state that is already suffering from instability; otherwise, the oblivion will become despair.

First appeared on Today's Zaman daily:
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Turkey's KRG policy: Is it a healthy one?

KRG President Massoud Barzani (L) greets Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the AK Party congress. (Photo: AA, Kayhan Özer)

The relations between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq are shining nowadays, thanks to economic cooperation and Turkish investment in flourishing cities of the KRG. The energy partnership is expected to boost the ties between the two parties still further. But the Turkish government's political relationship with leaders of northern Iraq seems to be more personal than with the region's authorities as a whole; that's why it lowers the expectations for a long and sustainable relationship between Ankara and the KRG. To avoid that, Turkey should change its policy toward the KRG to a more comprehensive one that embraces all parties of the region.

The ties between Turkey and the KRG have a young history, starting just three years ago. But they have been improving very rapidly. However the relations have mostly remained only with Massoud Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani's Kurdistan Democracy Party (KDP), which controls less than half of the Kurdish region. However, Turkey's relationship with the other parties is very limited. Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls the other part of the KRG, is closer to Iran, and makes up 50 percent of the cabinet. Also, the places that are under the PUK's control have more oil and natural gas than those under the KDP's control, and natural resources are one of the main factors driving the relations between the two parties. This is why many inside the region think that relations between Turkey and the KRG are more personal than the ones between the two national governments. Turkey should seek stronger ties with the PUK because without them, she cannot build an energy partnership with the KRG. Even though Turkey and the PUK already have ties and a high delegation from the PUK visited Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last month, these ties are still far weaker compared with the ones with the KDP.

Not only that, if Turkey wants a sustainable partnership with the KRG, it should expand its ties to include the opposition as well, especially the main opposition Gorran movement. The Gorran Movement for Change, which holds 23 percent of the Kurdish parliament, is expected to perform better in the upcoming election, anticipated to be held in August. Gorran is particularly expecting to win in the PUK-held oil-rich territories, which should cause concern for Turkey. Last year, the Turkish government invited Nawsherwan Mustafa, leader of the Gorran movement, to visit Ankara, but that has never happened. While Gorran's relationship with Iran is well established, this could change because this movement is a liberal force; it has no ideological connection to Iran, only shared interests. There is also a possibility that both the PUK and Gorran will make a coalition government without the KDP. Turkey's relations with the KRG will decline at the expense of Iran's because its ally, the KDP, will no longer be the governing party.

Given the fact that Turkey supports democratic change in the region, it should also do the same in the KRG, which suffers from weak democratic institutions and corruption. It should press the ruling parties to make some reforms to consolidate democracy and human rights. If Turkey does those things, then it can secure the supply for its energy-hungry economy with the KRG's huge amount of oil and natural gas.

First appeard:
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Iraqi Kurds welcome Öcalan’s message

A wave of reactions, mostly positive, followed Abdullah Öcalan’s call for cease-fire and withdrawal of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters from Turkish territories to northern Iraq, which also raised hope for ultimate peace in Turkey’s Southeast.

Kurdish administrations in northern Iraq that enjoy strong alliance with Turkey welcomed Öcalan’s message. Massoud Barzani, the president of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, welcomed the message in a statement and showed his support for it. “This is what we have been calling for for a long time: the settlement of the Kurdish issue through political means not military ones,” Barzani said in the statement. The Kurdish president added, “Peace talks should be considered as a strategic process, not as a tactical or a temporary one.”

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) also sees Öcalan’s message as a positive one. “The KRG welcomes and supports any step from both Kurds and the Turkish government to solve the Kurdish issue through peaceful and political means,” it said in a statement, also calling on both sides not to let anyone sabotage this peace process. 

Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has also shown its support for the message, saying, “We hope Turkey’s new constitution will give equal rights to Turkey’s all ethnic groups.” The PUK’s statement also hoped for an agreement between Turkey’s AKP and the PKK in Turkish parliament.

The main opposition parties in the KRG also supported the message. Nawshirwan Mustafa, leader of the Gorran Movement for Change, an opposition group in the KRG, was among the crowd in Diyarbakır on March 21 when Öcalan’s message was read out. The Kurdistan Islamic Union, another opposition party that is considered to be ideologically close to the AKP, also showed its full support for the message, saying, “We hope everyone sees this message as a turning point in solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey.” The statement also thanked both AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkish President Abdullah Gül that are “engineers of the peace talks.”

Many Kurdish intellectuals and influential figures also welcomed the message and considered it an important change in Abdullah Öcalan’s and PKK’s mentality.

Meanwhile some ultra-nationalist Kurds especially those living in Europe condemned the message and accused Öcalan for betraying the Kurdish struggle for independence.

Published here earlier:
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Shedding Light on the Paris Killing Mystery

Abdulla Hawez 

Many scenarios have been put forward to explain the recent murders of the three Paris-based Kurdish activists (Sakîne Cansiz - Fîdan Dogan - Leyla Soylemez), all of whom were members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party,­ more commonly known by the initials PKK.  Most of these explanations were overly hasty and unconvincing, with a few exceptions.  Here I show why neither Turkish ultra-nationalist, nor a radical wing inside the PKK carried out the assassinations; but an external force that wants to derail the peace talks committed it.

The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan stated a couple hours after the incident that “it might be an internal conflict”. Mr. Erdogan’s evidence is that “the killer or killers had gotten into a building with a security door code, and had somehow managed to get into the office without breaking down the door”. In reality, there is very thin evidence to support this. According to witnesses “the building where assassination took place was not that difficult to access as claimed” says Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a journalist who traveled to Paris after the incident. “The assassination was professionally planned” he adds. It seems to be planned and done by a powerful intelligence agency. There are speculations that they opened door to killers. Killers might have followed them in.

It is true that the PKK contains various wings. It is also true that some are more radical than others. However, unlike all previous occasions, all the factions of the PKK are in agreement on the present negotiations with the Turkish government, simply because the negotiator is Abdullah Öcalan. Mr. Öcalan is the pillar that unites all the factions of the PKK and the other organizations related to it. The hunger strike that lasted more than 60 days in the fall of last year showed how powerful he is. According to a leader of the PKK who spoke with me on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the current situation, Sakîne Cansiz, the main target of the assassination, was one of the consensus-building leaders who had worked to balance relations between the PKK’s different wings. Some Turkish media outlets are claiming that Cansiz was killed because she was “pro- peace talks”, without acknowledging that all the PKK factions are presently pro- peace talks, because of the involvement of Mr. Öcalan, whom they see as their spiritual father.

For the first time, roughly all the major players in Turkish politics agreed on the necessity for negotiations between the Turkish government and the imprisoned leader of the PKK. Even the Turkish nationalists agreed that it was time to tackle the decades-long Kurdish issue: this was not because they wished to embrace the PKK, or even the current government, but simply because there are serious threats to Turkey’s unity at present; more, in fact, than at any previous time. All Turkish political factions are aware of this. The rapid developments in neighboring Syria and Iraq, especially regarding the case of the Kurds in these countries, are threatening Turkey. Furthermore, this year was very tough for the Turkish army, as hundreds of them have been killed in some of the bloodiest encounters with the PKK since 1991.  Interestingly, the Turkish ultra-nationalists, who have a lavish record of assassinating Kurdish dissidents inside Turkey, have not much that record abroad -- even when they were much stronger than now. The Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is the main opposition party and includes as its members much of the shadowy world of the notorious Turkish "deep state", has notably welcomed the negotiations.  

According to a Wikileaks cable, more than five years ago the American ambassador to Turkey, Ross Wilson, advised the Turkish government to limit the financial resources of the PKK in Europe by arresting both Reza Altun and Sakîne Cansiz. Altun had been one of the main money collectors for the PKK in Europe and was jailed in France in July 2006, and later exiled to Iraqi Kurdistan.  Cansiz, one of the three targets in the Paris incident was according to the US ambassador’s report the agent responsible for the purchase of the PKK’s weapons. She was also, according to Turkish media, one of the PKK negotiators in the Oslo talks between the Turkish intelligence agency and the PKK. She was arrested Germany on the 27th of August 2007 and held for forty days before being released by the court of Hamburg.

The main target of the Paris incident is Sakîne Cansiz; the other two were in the wrong place and in the wrong time. This scenario seems unlikely because Cansiz had supported the peace talks and disarmament of the PKK if the talks succeeded. If the Wikileaks wire proves correct, the Turkish government might have been trying to send multiple messages by ordering the hit. First, to show the PKK it’s capability to hit hard even if the negotiations were to fail. Second, to force the PKK to accept difficult concessions. Additionally, it may have had the purpose of widening the differences inside the PKK by persuading some portion of its members as well as the world at large that the Paris incident was an internal conflict over the peace talks with the Turkish government.

The most probable scenario is that an external force committed the assassinations. This scenario is the strongest amongst all scenarios for several reasons. This is the first time that both the Turkish and Kurdish sides have been seriously engaging in peace talks that might finally disentangle the Kurdish question. The only barrier that has blocked Turkey’s development has been the Kurdish issue. Solving this problem would be a big step for Turkey in terms of economy, foreign policy and joining the EU. This would automatically be a setback for Turkey’s regional rivals, especially those who have Kurdish minorities; namely Iran and Syria. Mr. Erdogan once said that terrorism has cost Turkey more than 400 billion dollars, in spite of the lost of many human resources. We can see that the region is passing through a crucial period that might witness the remapping of the political landscape. With Mr. Erdogan’s government backing the Syrian opposition, the Paris incident might be well linked with the events in the neighboring Syria. We should consider that previous week the Syrian wing of the PKK fought with the regime forces for the first time. This was a very important development as the PKK had been allied with the regime before. Iran, an important regional powerhouse, is also concerned. If the Kurds in Turkey finally find peace, the Kurds of Iran, who compromise 10% of the population, will probably be motivated to seek autonomy, especially as a growing number of them have been hanged lately. Additionally, the PKK that once was part of the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus axis, might distance itself from them if the peace talks in Turkey succeed. Therefore the peace talks contain multiple negative possibilities for Iran. Aside from all this, we should consider that Iran has a long and notorious history of foreign assassination, from the famous Kurdish politician Abdul Rahman Qasimlo to Sadiq Sharafkandi and Fazil Rasul, both Kurdish politicians. There can be more than one message if the culprit is Iran. First, to the PKK leaders, that nowhere will be safe or peaceful for you, even if you get an agreement with the Turkish government to disarm and reside in Europe. Second, to the Turkish government, that they are capable of poisoning any efforts to reconcile with adversaries on Turkish soil: not while the Turkish state supports the toppling of Iran’s most important ally, the Syrian regime.

Why Paris? For two reasons: because they wanted to target Sakîne Cansiz, the PKK’s most controversial leader, both the Turkish government and the PKK can be accused of murdering her, this way Iran would be distanced from the case. The second reason: because she was based in Paris because Turkey’s ties with France had been deteriorating over the French parliament’s recognition of the Armenian genocide, which Ankara denies.

Whoever is the perpetrator, it should be denounced. Those who carried this action out are dark forces who want bloodshed to continue, and don’t want a prosperous Turkey to emerge from a lasting peace.      

Iraq’s next president

Some of the leading figures of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

 Abdulla Hawez

Lately the massive demonstrations in the predominately Sunni cities in the central and north of Iraq took over the talks about who will be Talabani’s successor as the president of the republic of Iraq. According to confirmed sources, even if Talabani’s health gets better, he will not be able re-enter the political life, due to the seriousness of his health condition. Now, quite serious meetings have started between the Kurdish leadership in Erbil and Sulimania to appoint someone to replace Talabani. However, apparently, there is more than one challenge that faces Kurdish leadership, Talabani’s the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in particular to nominate someone for Iraq’s presidency. On Sunday, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan regional government (KRG), Nichervan Barzani has paid a quick visit to Tehran to discuss the matter with Iranian authorities, they have promised to back a Kurdish candidate for the position. Here are our predictions about Iraq’s next president based on information from sources close from Kurdish leadership:

Dr. Barham Ahmed Salih: Talabani’s favorite politician, and his most probable successor. He has built inclusive connections with American decision-makers, when he was serving as the PUK’s representative in Washington DC. Salih has PhD in computer engineering from the University of Liverpool. If Talabani’s health condition improves, he will be having more chance to get the position, because Talabani has always backed him. What decreases Dr. Salih’s opportunity to get the position is the strong refusal from Iran. Moreover, what reduces Dr. Salih’s opportunity further is the rebuff, even inside his party. Dr. Salih has never been loved inside the leadership council of the PUK, as he has always been appointed by direct interventions from Talabani. Also, many of the PUK leaders accuse him of being close from Masoud Barzani’s the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the historical rival of the PUK. Furthermore, the Kurdistan’s main opposition party leader, Nawsherwan Mustafa that has split from the PUK, refuses Dr. Salih’s nomination for the post. Mr. Mustafa is Dr. Salih’s personal opponent; both of them are struggling to gain more popularity in their hometown, Sulimania, the KRG’s second largest city. Despite those challenges, he has resilient chance to get the position. Even though, according to the strategic agreement between Talabani’s the PUK and Barzani’s the KDP, the post of Iraqi presidency will go to the PUK, but Masoud Barzani, the close ally of Turkey, will be having louder voice in appointing Talabani’s successor. Barzani’s hand will most likely pick Dr. Salih, as Barzani has insisted in the continuing negotiations between the two parties that have started previous week. Correspondingly, the PUK’s interim leader, Kosrat Rasul Ali, will back Dr. Salih for the position.

Dr. Najmaldin Karim: He is the most recent becoming-popular leader in the Kurdistan region. Talabani’s close friend, and one of the most experienced Kurdish leaders. Dr. Kareem, the former director of the Washington Kurdish Institute is now the governor of oil-rich city of Kirkuk, both central government of Baghdad and the KRG are disputing over the territories of this city. Dr. Karim is a neurosurgeon with American citizenship. He came back to Iraq in 2010. Since becoming the governor of Kirkuk in 2010, massive construction and building process has undertaken in the city. For those who are familiar with the city, huge development can be felt. Dr. karim is famous of holding the stick in the middle. When al-Maliki’s ties with the Turkish government were at its lowest point, Dr.Karim has received both Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in less than a month. Despite, his ties with the Americans, Dr. Karim have meanwhile strong ties with Iranians and Turks. Furthermore, he is the most consensual person inside his party and among Kurds as well.

Hero Ibrahim Ahmed: Mrs. Hero is Talabani’s spouse, and daughter of one of the most important Kurdish figures in the recent history. What rise Mrs. Hero’s star in the competition of getting the Iraq’s presidency position is the strong backing inside her party, as well as from the main opposition leader, Nawsherwan Mustafa, the historical leader of the PUK that has split from the party in 2008. Mrs. Hero has Iran’s support as well. Yet, Mrs. Hero’s appointment might shut off by mass denial from the lower members of the PUK and ordinary people of the Kurdistan region due to her notorious history regarding corruption and nepotism. In addition, many are complaining of her low leadership and communication skills.

What’s important here is that Turkey will have a big hand in appointing Iraq’s next president. After backing the demonstrations in the Sunni cities that seems to become effective, Turkey’s next target will be the presidency. Whoever becomes Iraq’s next president, it will be a lose for Iranian regime, because no one would be as loyal as Talabani, Iran’s historical ally. Nevertheless, Iranians will not give up imposing their will, but sooner or later, they will understand that their leverage isn’t as strong as before.    

WHY TALABANI MATTERS THE MOST?

Abdulla Hawez

Since the deterioration of President Jalal Talabani’s health on Monday night, his condition has dominated the headlines in Iraq. At stake is not only the end of a president, but also the possible end of the era of peaceful negotiations between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad.

What differs Talabani from the other politicians in Iraq is that if he dies it would shake Kurdistan’s and Iraq’s political landscape equally. The president is both Kurdistan’s and Iraq’s number one heavyweight politician, and the only one that can keep the balance both in Kurdistan internally and with the central government in Baghdad.

Together with Mustafa Barzani (who founded the Kurdistan Democratic Party – KDP – and is the father of Kurdistan’s president Masoud Barzani), Jalal Talabani’s was the driving force behind the Kurdish revolution that started in 1961. His political career started more than 65 years ago, at the age of 14.

In 1975, Talabani left the KDP and founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which became the dominant party in Kurdistan, much thanks to its armed movement that re-started the revolution in 1976.

After the Kurdish uprising against the Ba’ath regime in 1991, elections were held for Kurdistan’s newly established parliament, in which PUK and its historical rival KDP gained almost equal shares of the votes. Since 1995, there has been internal conflicts over power between these two major parties, which led to the split of the Kurdistan region into two government administrations; one in Erbil, the current capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the other in Sulimania, the KRG’s second largest city.

In 1998, an agreement between the two parties was brokered in Washington under the supervision of the then-US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. PUK and KDP agreed to govern the Kurdistan Regional Government based on a 50-50% sharing of power.

Since PUK always took part in the elections jointly with the KDP, problems occurred as the PUK lost almost half of its popular support to the change movement. What have kept the balance and stability since then have been Talabani’s statesmanship skills and the strategic agreement between PUK and KDP.

Since the split in 2008, the PUK is suffering from internal differences, where Talabani is the only guarantee for keeping PUK from disintegrating further. There is an argument whether PUK will remain after Talabani dies or leaves the political scene, with the odds not looking too good. The most likely scenario is that the majority of PUK members will join the change movement, while a few of them will join the ruling KDP. Even if PUK persists, it will become a very weak party.

What is at stake is not only PUK’s survival, but also the balance of power in Kurdistan. Talabani is maintaining that balance in many respects. First, he is the only man that can be balance Masoud Barzani as the most powerful man in Kurdistan, and he is the only one that can challenge him. Furthermore, the end of Talabani may lead to the end of power sharing in Kurdistan, at least in its current shape.

The change movement is likely to replace PUK, but the problem is that they are very critical of the KDP, which will cause difficulties for cooperating. There are two scenarios: either the KDP will accept some political reform, in which case after elections one of them accept to become the opposition, or there will be further division. The latter would also mean further division between the two major cities; Erbil and Sulimania, because Erbil is the stronghold of the KDP and Sulimania is the stronghold of the change movement.

Since becoming the president of Iraq in 2005, Talabani has upheld excellent ties with all political players in Iraq, while no one else could do so, functioning as a mediator between the religious sects.

President Talabani has been the reason of the still-not-so-bad relationship between the KRG and Baghdad. Only a couple of hours before being hospitalized, he met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to tackle the increasingly violent tensions between Kurdistan and the central government through dialogue instead of military means.

Talabani has also been the only Kurdish figure that could keep warm ties with the ruling Shiite leaders in Baghdad. He has also built strong ties with the Sunni Arab leaders, advising them to engage further in the political life. After him, the hardliners on both sides will dominate the arena. All connections between the Prime Minister al-Maliki and Kurdistan’s President Masoud Barzani have gone through Talabani.

A possible further deterioration of the already worsening ties between the KRG and Baghdad may eventually lead to the separation of Kurds from Iraq, because for Kurds, independence from Iraq is only a matter of time. Talabani has been arguing that the time hasn’t yet come for independence, while Barzani is more enthusiastic about it.

On the regional stage, he has engaged in dialogue with Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria at the same time. Iran’s parliament speaker told Prime Minister al-Maliki when he was in Baghdad last month that if the Iranians were forced to choose between him and Talabani, they would choose the latter. The president’s ties with Turkish leaders have also been excellent. He has been mediating between the Turkish government and the PKK to find a solution for the decades-long Kurdish question in Turkey.

This piece has first appeared on Your Middle East:http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/abdulla-hawez-why-talabani-matters-the-most_11805

We need a break

Abdulla Hawez

Kurdistan's Erbil has been appointed this year to be the tourism capital of the Arab world in 2014. Kurdistan, especially its capital Erbil, has developed very rapidly in the last eight years. 

Kurds, through out the history, has lived in wars and violence confrontations. One of the major reasons has been ethnical. The other had been historically geographical; Kurdistan had been the border between two major empires, the Ottomans and Safavids, that’s why most of the wars had been mainly erupted in the Kurdish terrains. In the first half of the prior century, as the nationalist sentiment has arisen in the region, Kurdish struggle for an independent sovereign state has been continuing until nowadays. The only part of Kurdistan that could gain relatively notable achievements has been Kurds of Iraq.
Iraqi Kurdistan has a quasi-state since 1991 when a no-fly zone had been imposed under the Iraqi Kurdish areas by the United Nations. Since then, local government, and the state institutions that has been founded gradually could ran the region, even though there were international, regional and Iraqi sanctions over the region, which was quite challenging to survive, but Kurds could linger.
The key event that has changed the condition of Kurdistan and opened the doors toward it has been the liberation process in 2003 by the coalition forces led by the United States. Very rapid development with huge budget from the central government flew to Kurdistan, so that helped Kurds to develop. In less than ten years, with Kurds could keep their region peaceful and far from violence, they could achieve what could be achieved in decades. Fairly strong democratic institutions, sturdy representation of the opposition in the parliament, free media, and protecting minority rights. None of those have been done in the rest of Iraq, mainly because of insecurity and sectarian bloodshed.
Peace is the core for any development. Without peace, Kurds couldn’t achieve, what they have achieved. Iraq is a rich country with lots of natural resources that could be shared among all Iraqis. However, the country has been mentioned among worst countries in the world in many reports this year. Insecurity, which has resulted from sectarian violence and security vacuum, led the country to this track.
Kurds need more time to build up their region, and compensate centuries of suppression and tyranny that led to backwardness and ignorance, so do Iraqis.
As the two sides, Iraqi government and Kurdistan regional government are mobilizing troops in the disputed areas of Kirkuk province, both nations should reject this action. There is a huge possibility to compromise the case through dialogue, as they have never done so seriously. Now, the loudest voice is the one of radicals who prefers violence to tackle the matter. To abandon a war, the people of these areas should decide their future, not the ones of Baghdad and Erbil. To achieve this, you need to keep peace for some more years, as the development has just started in Kirkuk in the couple last years. In peace, the people of these areas can decide their future. Understandably, both government of Erbil and Baghdad want to impose their will on this issue, but the will of the people of these areas should be the core for any future compromise. Otherwise, neither the issue will be tackled, nor the country will witness peace which is needed for any development that Iraqis awaiting it from a long time.
Neither Kurds nor Arabs could benefit from the violence, as they have already experienced it in the last ten years. Wisdom is something that could appear in such circumstances. It’s the time for Iraqis to start re-building their country, and Kurds continue building up their region further. This is the only way to make the people satisfied. We need a break from wars and violence. We really do.

Abdulla can be reached through: @abdullahawez