New (old) Sectarian Blocs: Neo Ottomans vs. Neo Safavids

On Syria, most of the Shi'ite Muslims are supporting Bashar Al-Assad because he is Allawi (an offshoot of Shi'ite sect). Similarly, Sunnis are supporting Bahrain's one-family rule monarchy, because the ruling King is Sunni. 

Abdulla Hawez

In the wake of the 'Arab Spring' especially Syrian uprising, we're seeing very interesting bedfellows emerge, the new regional alliances are apparently resetting based on historical sectarian division. Both Turkey and Iran, the regional heavyweights and heirs to imperial pasts, their current Islamist governments are set upping the regional formulas based on Sunni-Shi'a division, seemingly, as the situation in Syria getting more violent the further division between the two blocs becomes more evident. The regional division gives signals that re-emerge of the classical regional alliance underway in a new style, as the Arab Spring becomes more religious.

As the classical Safavids and Ottomans empires, the new regional alliances are as the following: Turkey which is biggest regional Sunni power is allying with the Sunni Arabian Peninsula countries leading by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In addition, the Sunni oppositions in the region like Arab Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq and Sunni-led opposition in Lebanon, as well as the Sunni-backed opposition in Syria which likely after the topple of Bashar Al-Assad will take over the power. Meanwhile, Iran's regional power consists of Assad's regime in Syria and the fragile government in Lebanon which lead by Hizbolla, as well as the Shi'ite ruling bloc in Iraq, Shi'ite opposition in Bahrain and Turkey's Kurdish rebel organization, PKK.

Similar to the cold war between United States and Soviet Union, expectedly we will witness economic and political war between those two blocs. Even, the military conflict is possible, while the Syrian revolution becomes more violent. Turkey and Saudi Arabia already threatened to intervene in Syria if Kofi Anan's peace plan failed and the main agenda for Turkish Prime Minister's visit to Saudi Arabia is the possible scenarios against Syria. Iran and its regional allies, in the other hand, possibly won't only become watchers.

Christians' future in the Iraqi Kurdistan

Abdulla Hawez

As it becomes clear that one major outcome of the region’s revolutions  will be the empowerment of Islamists, the Arab Spring threatens to become a nightmare for the Middle East’s Christian minority. Christians across the Arab world are afraid that a change of regime – specifically one resulting in a theocracy – will mean a removal or reduction of their rights. A large proportion of the Middle East’s Christian population  lives in Egypt and Syria,  both of which have seen big changes since the start of the Arab Spring. The Christians in Iraq, meanwhile, have suffered greatly as a result of the country’s  security vacuum over the past decade. In the Arab Spring countries, the situation continues to look uncertain for the Christians, who have seen already the implementation of Islamist practices and policies in Egypt, including the jailing of actors and actress for their having starred previously in tongue-in-cheek movies about Islamists, Adel Emam, the most famous Egyptian actor for his movie The Terrorist jailed for four months is an excellent example. In Syria, the revolution is increasingly becoming a sectarian conflict. In Iraq, meanwhile, the targeting of Christians, often resulting in their  displacement if not their deaths,  has become an almost daily activity for terrorists.
While many Christians have left the country, those who preferred to remain in Iraq often sought refuge in the north. Kurdistan’s flourishing capital of Erbil has hosted many of those Christians who have had to flee from places such as Baghdad and Musil. Over the last few years, the Kurdish region has seen many crucial achievements that are still missing in other parts of Iraq, above all, security and attracting foreign investment. One of these achievements, or so the story goes, is the hosting of a large part of Iraq’s Christian minority, a phenomenon which has brought positive international attention to the region. Almost all of the reports on this subject give  optimistic news about the Christians’ situation in Kurdistan; to put this to the test, I tried to go inside the Christian community (which is by and large a conservative one) to figure out how they feel about their current situation.
Iraqi Christians are barely 1% of Iraq’s population. At present they are mainly to be found  in the predominately Christian town of Ankawa, which is located in the suburbs of Erbil,  and in smaller concentrations  around Musil and Baghdad. According to unofficial statistics, the population of Ankawa is currently around 35,000; of this, original residents make up 15,000, Muslims 4,000, and displaced  Christians from all around Iraq  the rest of the figure.
Christians in Kurdistan live in self-imposed isolation, remaining within community boundaries in order to feel secure. When one enters the Christian enclave which the building infrastructure development is evident the psychological pressure under which the inhabitants live can easily be felt. Speaking to Christians, one hears about how uncertain they are regarding their future, especially after the regime changes in the region. “The Arab Spring is a problem for Christians” says David Saka, 23, studying business and management at a British-style university in Erbil. The collective voice of Islamists in Kurdistan has become louder since the revolutions began; this in itself makes Christians scared. Saka is a close friend with the son of one of the Kurdish Islamist leaders that scares him. He says he has no problem with the father of his friend –rather, he has a problem with his ideology. Hilda Khorany, a clothing designer, also feels “threatened” when she hears the word “Islamists”. Khorany, showing a beautiful smile, said that she “loves Kurdistan” and that most of her friends are Kurds, but that she doesn’t wish to see the rise of Islamists in the province. Both Saka and Khorany feel happy with the current government in Kurdistan, and perceive it as liberal.
However two other young Christians, who preferred to remain anonymous,  said that “there is a big conspiracy against us [Christians]”.  For many years, the young man insisted, “it was forbidden for Muslims to buy lands in Ankawa, but now they are occupying our town through investments”. He mentioned a huge project by a Turkish company to build residential houses there –  which, according to him, have been bought mainly by Arab Muslims. He complained also about plans to build  a mosque in Ankawa to accommodate of the rapidly growing number of Muslims. He also indicated that their culture is being destroyed through the building of bars and nightclubs. Saka and Khorany each added their own complaints about the amount of bars in their town. The anonymous young Christian even stated that he wished to be ruled by Islamists rather than the current government, because “at least then we will live with dignity. While they may ask for Jizyah, we have lots of money to pay”.
Following up on the story of the expanding number of bars and clubs – a phenomenon which has led some to refer to Ankawa as Iraq’s red light district – shows a complicated situation behind the scenes. There was supposed to be a bill in the Kurdish parliament to limit the number of bars in Ankawa, but it couldn’t be passed for political reasons. According to sources, most of the bars belong to high-ranking Iraqi and Kurdish officials, meaning that no-one can close them, even though most of them are illegal. When the mayor of Ankawa, a Christian, closed a bar for being only 10 meters away from a church, he was told by an official: “you want to make Ankawa like Afghanistan”.  When Christian activists tried to protest against the increasing number of bars and nightclubs, they were threatened with physical removal by unknown people, believed to from the men of bar owners. Christians are further handicapped by a reluctance to be involved in political life. While  they have a number of small parties, these can normally barely  gather 100 members, who seem  to spend time collecting money and little else. Nevertheless, in the Kurdish parliament Christians have five secure seats according to the quota system in place, and non-Christian politicians are not unsympathetic. The Kurdish president, Masoud Barzani, has been recognized  many times by the Vatican and by western countries for protecting Christians, who  have been targeted elsewhere in Iraq on a daily basis.
Most of the Christians that I met complained of the gradual demise of their language and culture. The Syriac language, which is used on a day-to-day basis by the Kurdistan Christians, is taught in only  two schools.  This language has roots in the Assyrian civilization, whose presence in Iraq goes back several thousands of years; because of this,  Christians may feel that on some level they are the “owners” of the land, and that they represent the strongest link to its most ancient heritage. However, like other sects in Iraq, the Christians are divided.  The Christians of southern Iraq tend to speak only Arabic, and  are distinct from the Christians of Kurdistan, who tend to speak Syriac, along with Kurdish and Arabic. All the Kurdistan Christians that I met complained about the Southern-Iraqi Christians, whom they saw as being  careless  on matters of religion and  culture. Moreover, Kurdistan Christians mainly support the idea of an independent Kurdish state, while Southern-Iraqi Christians pray for a united Iraq.
When it comes to their own individual prospects, the Christians are diverse in their views. David Saka says he will stay in Kurdistan because he feels that  he can build a future there, and because  he feels that  “It is [his] homeland.”  He says that “Christianity was built with our blood, beginning with the blood of Jesus. The more they persecute us the more it grows.” Hilda Khorany also wishes to continue her career in Kurdistan, saying that she plans to put on a fashion show. On the other hand, the anonymous young informant  sees the Christians’ destiny as one that will be lived outside Iraq. “We will be forced, whether directly through physical violence or indirectly through psychological pressure, to leave our homeland one day. Our future isn’t here anymore.”

Syrian Kurds seek federalism

A Portrait of Syrian Kurdish boy draws the old Syrian flag on his face,
 and wears Kurdish "Jamadani" over his neck. 

Abdulla Hawez

          Syrian Kurds seek federalism amid the increasing chance for toppling Assad's regime, as they are negotiating with the Syrian National Council to increase corporation.

I talked with a member of Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC) and member of the negotiating delegation with (SNC), Talal Ibrahim Pasha. He said, they are still negotiating with the Syrian National Council (SNC), as they will meet up again on 18th of this month. Mr. Pasha said, KNC which represent most of the Kurdish parties in Syria and supported by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) insists on self-determination for Kurds if Bashar Assad toppled, they aren't seeking independence, but targeting federalism probably close to northern Iraq's Kurdish style, meanwhile, so far, SNC told them (KNC) that they admit Kurds have suffered the most during Al-Assad's era, but they prefer giving Kurds their rights without self-determination. Furthermore, he said, they are closer to Syrian National Council than before, as they may compromise at the end, the meeting on 18th of this month may make the shape of relationship between Arabic Syrian National Council and Kurdish National Council clearer.

          Kurdish National Council (KNC), close to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), hold its first conference in Kurdistan's de facto capital of Erbil, later criticized by PKK-backed Democratic Union Party (PYD). While, the Syrian uprising apparently divides the whole region, Kurds also divide over the matter. (KNC) which is close to (KRG) supports foreign intervention to topple Assad's regime, while (PYD) supports the dialogue with the regime. KRG is closer to Turkey, while PKK is close to Iran and Syria. 

Eager for new alliances, Assad's opponents look to Iraqi Kurdistan

Samir Geagea received Hero's welcome in Arbil's predominately Christan district of Ankawa. In the picture, Geagea crosses in front of a piece of writing which has written "the people of Ankawa welcomes Kurdistan's beloved guest    Dr. Samir Geagea".

Lately, Iraqi Kurdistan has seen a surge in political activity, from the visit of Burhan Ghalioun, chairman of the Syrian National Council (SNC), to Walid Jumblatt, a prominent Lebanese Druze leader, to Samir Geagea, from the Lebanese opposition bloc, to Turkey's Deputy Foreign Minister Feridun Sinirlioğlu.

For some, the stream of political leaders to Kurdistan might be normal, but lately all political leaders who have visited Kurdistan are in one way or another linked to Syria. Those who have visited Kurdistan are anti-Syria Lebanese leaders, from the Syrian opposition or from Turkey, an important player in the Syrian crisis. According to information I acquired from sources close to Massoud Barzani's ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), in the group's meetings with the above people, Barzani has been discussing Syria
Ghalioun's meeting with Barzani, which took place two weeks ago, was mostly about guarantees from the SNC for Kurds in Syria, which was made in return for an agreement in which the Kurdish National Council, which represents most Kurdish parties in Syria, will join the SNC.
Syrian Kurds have some demands which they tie to membership in the SNC, including the right to study in Kurdish in predominately Kurdish cities and the right to limited regional autonomy. Ghalioun promised to discuss the conditions with other members of the SNC.
Yet some Kurds still haven't joined the demonstrations -- which may suggest they belong to pro-Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) parties. According to some Kurdish journalists who visited senior PKK leader Murat Karayılan last August, the PKK doesn't want Bashar al-Assad to be toppled. The PKK has historical ties with the Syrian regime, and they used to set up camp in Syrian territory prior to the imprisonment of PKK leader and founder Abdullah Öcalan in 1999.
Lebanese Druze leader Jumblatt, who claims to have a neutral stance regarding Syria, met with Barzani in mid-December. Jumblatt used to be a diehard opponent of Assad. Jumblatt, who is of Kurdish origin, discussed with Barzani the idea of withdrawing his party from the Lebanese government if need be.
Prominent Lebanese politician Geagea's meeting with Barzani was also motivated by the Syrian crisis. According to unconfirmed information, Barzani, who himself has strong ties with many Lebanese parties, is trying to convince Jumblatt to negotiate with Geagea's opposition party to topple Lebanon's current government, which is dominated by Hezbollah. Turkey has had a harsh stance on the Syrian regime since the start of the uprising and is believed to have asked Barzani, a strong ally of Turkey, to use his ties with Lebanese parties to topple any pro-Assad government in Lebanon.
Deputy Foreign Minister Sinirlioğlu paid a visit to the Iraqi city of Arbil to discuss the development of closer ties with Barzani.
In addition, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), which has strong ties with Iran, Turkey and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, is mediating between Iran and the Syrian Brotherhood, because the Syrian Brotherhood knows if Iran continues to support Assad, there will be little hope of toppling the regime without foreign intervention. Again, Turkey, specifically Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, personally asked Selahaddin Bahaddin, head of the KIU, to use the group's own privileged position to open negotiations between Iran and the Syrian   Brotherhood. For this, Bahaddin paid a visit to İstanbul to see the leaders of the Syrian Brotherhood and then visited Tehran. Moreover, later, Bahaddin flew to Sudan to see Iran's friends, Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal, who both have a good relationship with Iran and an Islamist background. What they discussed is not yet known. Furthermore, a week ago, Bahaddin met with a delegation from the Kurdish National Council, according to a source close to the KIU; Bahaddin is trying to mediate between Syrian Kurds and the Brotherhood as well. The Syrian Kurds are striving to get guarantees from the opposition regarding Kurds amid the growing opportunity of toppling Assad's regime.
Iraqi Kurdistan, with its strategic geo-political location between Syria, Turkey and Iran, is becoming a vital place for political activity between different actors playing a role in the Syrian crisis. Kurds are trying to keep up good relations with Middle Eastern giants Iran and Turkey. Barzani, who used to have good ties with Assad's regime, seemingly turned toward the opposition with the growing opportunity of the uprising's success in Syria.

*Abdulla Hawez is a freelance journalist based in Iraqi Kurdistan. Follow him: @abdullahawez


This article has first appeared on Today's Zaman:
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=269326


This article has re-published under my permission on DIMPOOL, Policy center:
http://www.dimpool.com/2012/01/abdulla-hawez-bashar-al-assad-opponents-are-flowing-to-kurdistan/

AKP’s silent revolution has a blemish

While we hear about the achievements of Turkey’s AKP government especially in the Middle East after the Arab Spring, AKP’s government internally is facing a real challenge after the further detonation recently in ties with the minority Kurds that are making around 20% of Turkey’s population.  

            It’s widely believed that since AK Party came to power in 2003, a silent revolution has undertaken.  That revolution has swept all aspects in Turkey’s post-Kemalism era. Similarly, AKP has tried to solve Kurdish question through a process that called Democratization, by giving individuals more freedom. As the government has opened a 24 hours TV channel, TRT6, that airs programs in Kurdish. However, Kurds are accusing AKP for misleading the decades-standing Kurdish question. Kurds in the violence-ridden southeastern Turkey say AKP tries to erase Kurdish culture through TRT6, by airing twisted stories in Kurdish to convince the ordinary Kurds. Moreover, Layla Zana one of the prominent Kurdish leaders said the Kurdish question can’t be solved through giving more individual freedoms, but by giving Kurds their rights as a nation. Recently, the already detonated ties between government and Kurds worsen further after Turkish army jets killed 35 civilian, smuggler Kurds. Kurds say that shows how AKP government is still continuing the same policy of previous governments regarding Kurds in another style, while challenged all others blemishes. The worsening in ties between Kurds and Turkish government may lead to an uprising in the Kurdish cities in the wake of Arab Spring, as the anger of Kurds already turned to daily demonstrations in both Istanbul and southeastern region. PKK, which through his political wing, BDP, got 80% of the votes in latest election in southeastern region called on the Kurds to upraise against the Turkish government, as promised to ascendant attacks against Turkish army. Diyarbakır, the capital of southeastern Turkey, displays its politics. Graffiti throughout the city cheers PKK. Lately, more popular demonstrations has taken place in Diyarbakır, but aggressively quashed by the police. Meanwhile, Pro Kurdish Peace and Freedom Party or BDP lawmakers asked for the referendum in the predominately Kurdish southeast as a test for democracy in Turkey. Worthwhile, Kurds putted autonomy as a minimum demand regarding a solution for Kurdish question before. In respond, AKP strongly refused such demand, and claimed it threats Turkish unity. Turkish president Abdullah Gul many times described Turkey’s diversity as a source for richer Turkey, but never reflected in the real life. One of the local leaders of BDP in Diyarbakır told me Turkish prime minister delegitimizing the Al-Asad’s regime in Syria for Killing civilians and suppressing peaceful demonstrations, but same thing is happening here; last week at least 35 civilians Kurds killed and the peaceful demonstrations similarly suppressed. The local residences in the area believe that situation will continue until the Kurdish problem gets solved.

             The predominately Kurdish cities in southeastern Turkey are vividly ignored compared to the Turkish cities, as the Turkish state has tried to erase Kurds as a nation since the foundation of the republic in 1923. It would be rational to give all provinces in Turkey more power, even if the state doesn’t want to name it autonomy. It firstly takes off the more burdens that are facing the government with the government engaged further in the regional politics. Also it won’t differ Kurds from the rest of the country which government afraid to claim separation and get independence one day.  Moreover, Kurds still doesn’t have the right to study in their native language, as a first step, if government makes Kurdish an optional material in the predominately Kurdish cities, it can gradually solve the language problem as well. That brings peace to the southeastern area and then PKK, as promised, may lay down its weapon which Turkish army annually spending 10 billion dollars in fighting it; it also stops the imprisonment of thousands of Kurdish activists that have arrested in the name of terror recently, that’s in one hand. At the other hand, government needs to take those steps to make the economy’s flourishing continue. Last year, Turkish government unleashed a goal to make Turkey one of the 10 biggest economies in the world, engaging southeastern region is very important to reach this goal because this region makes one third of Turkish land and 20% of Turkish population.  The area is rich with agriculture, as there’s huge cheaper labor force, and with the historical places, it can be turned to a tourism hub. That will also accelerate government’s efforts to make Turkey one of the 10 first economies globally.    

            Turkey is witnessing a radical political standoff between government and Kurds anyways, as the whole region is chaging which that may weaken Turkey’s external ambitions. At the end either AKP government should give Kurds their rights as a nation firstly through the new promised civilian constitution that suppose to be ready by the second part of this year, or inspired by the Arab Spring Kurds will revolute loudly against AKP’s silent revolution, and take their rights by their own.

The realm of God

Hasan Al-Banna’s ascendancy in the region is about to become equal to Turkey’s Atatürk or beyond.

Abdulla Hawez

When a 22 young preacher found the society of Muslim brothers, just four  years after the end of Islamic Ottoman empire, he never thought his legacy will spread all over the Muslim world such as numerous as today; look across the Arab world today and political Islam has jumped to the fore.  Hasan AlBanna, lived for 42 years, is the Godfather of all political Islamic movements in the world. Al-Banna's Brotherhood founded in 1928, hounded by all governments despite professing a fairly moderate version of Islam; this relatively mild-mannered movement is known for its political savvy that bases its message on the texts of Islam as well as its pliability and discipline. A question rises regarding Al-Banna’s legacy and whether it’s a nasty one that threatens democracy? Also, are the skeptics who said that Arabs would inevitably elect malicious people, and could not handle democracy being proven unpleasantly right?

Let’s first take a glance on how brotherhood and other parties of a similar stripe are performing, according to the come outs so far; brothers are the first winners of the Arab Spring. In Egypt’s first and second round of voting, Brotherhood is winning the three-stage election to parliament by a wider margin than analysts predicted, with more than 40% of the seats. In North Africa Islamists of a similar school to the Brotherhood wins elections by a landslide in their countries, Tunisia’s Al-Nahda and Morocco’s Justice and Development party are just live-fresh examples, while Libya and Mauritania highly expected to do so too, in the elections in the upcoming year.

Similarly, in the other part of the Arab world, same scene expected to happen. In Syria, with every day that passes, President Bashar Al-Assad's grip on power seems to weaken; while Brotherhood is prominent in the strong opposition front that may displace Bashar Al-Assad eventually. In chaotic Yemen, Brotherhood’s political wing, AlIslah party already has a strong position in the interim government, as the party is pacing straightforward to come out a winner in the next elections according to pundits and questionnaires. Furthermore, Nobel peace prize winner, Tawakel Karman, is one of the leaders of AlIslah. That’s despite Palestine’s Hamas, which is a branch of Brotherhood. Moreover, in Sudan, Hassan Al-Basher is ideologically based on Brotherhood school, while in Jordan Muslim brothers have a strong voice, and Qatar is a Brotherhood friendly state. Whereas the other countries in the Middle East are under the sway of governments with an Islamist label as well, even though they have different hues.

Al-Banna tried to have new interpretations for the Islamic concepts which were controversial, hence he faced strong opponent from the local religious élite. He always claimed to uphold the call to Islam, not to impose it on people. He preached in coffeehouses, which were then a novelty and were generally viewed as morally suspect. Al-Banna, compared to religious views at his era, was a religious reformist, who was seeking the renewal of religion to fit with the current needs. Dr. Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh, former member of the executive bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood who was expelled from the long-banned party for choosing to join Egypt’s presidency race, once said that if Al-Banna was still a life, he will never allow Brotherhood to engage in politics such as today, because he hadn’t intended to develop the movement to become a political party, rather following the fail of the Ottoman Islamic empire, he wanted to relive the Islamic norms in the society. That augments doubts that succeeds have had veered his message and become more radical instead.

Some months ago, I talked with Dr. Essam Al-Arian, the spokesperson of the Muslim Brotherhood after the fail of Mubarak, he never gave a positive sign to adopt a model close to Turkey’s AKP one. Furthermore, half of Brotherhood’s members are women, yet they failed to arrive in the higher positions inside the movement, which raises questions on the women’s role in Egypt’s Brotherhood. However, Al-Arian said that they will uphold the rights of women and religious minorities in the next government which will be dominated by Brothers and other more radical Islamists.

Some western observers and internal liberal rivals see the Brotherhood as a mysterious society, pretending moderation and democracy in public while in private embracing a radical, authoritarian, anti-western agenda. Nevertheless, it widely believed that they will not enforce the veil or immediately ban alcohol, because they understand that people don’t vote for them because they seek Saudi or Iranian style of religious repression. Rather because of their hatred of corruption, the curse of secular dictatorships all through the region, and their promotion of justice and dignity.

Consequently, it can’t be proved instantly, whether Islamists will overturn the democratic process of election to entrenchment their power and impose their ideological beliefs or will protect the individual rights. The only incontrovertible thing, apparently, is the emergence of a realm in the Arab world that leads by the legacy of Hassan Al-Banna.

*Iraqi Kurdish freelance journalist writes about current Political issues in the Middle East.

What’s really going on in Iraq?

This week’s coordinated bombings in Baghdad are only the latest instance of growing sectarian tension in Iraq. The tone has been set by competition at the very heart of government, between Shi’ite Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki on the one hand and, on the other, Maliki’s deputy Salih Mutlaq and Vice-President Tariq Al-Hashimi, who are both Sunni. Their competition increasingly refracts regional tensions between Iran and Turkey on how to deal with the Syrian conflict.

Maliki is closely connected to the Iranian leaders, a fact that is increasingly relevant considering Iraq’s stated desire to mediate between the Syrian government and anti-Assad forces. An Iraqi delegation visited Damascus recently, ostensibly for this purpose. On the other hand, Iraqi Sunnis have strong ties with Turkey. Tariq Al-Hashimi particularly has a special relation with the leaders of Turkey’s AKP government – this year alone he has conducted several meetings with representatives of Erdogan’s government from Ankara.

Recent tensions between Iran and Turkey, on the Syrian issue and Nato missile defense, are affecting co-operation between Iraqi leaders, and Iran’s efforts to shift attention from Syria to Iraq is likely to exacerbate those challenges further.

The aspiration of the predominantly Sunni provinces of Salahadeen, Anbar and, more recently, Dyala to become more autonomous, if not independent of the central Iraqi governing authority, reportedly with Saudi-Turkish support, is another source of sectarian tension. Shi’ites accuse Sunnis of trying to divide Iraq, accusations that led Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Mahdi militia to intervene in Diyala, a province with a 20 per cent Shi’ite population.

All these developments are accelerating a situation of intense speculation. For example, following a recent trip to London by Jordan’s King Abdullah, rumors began circulating of a scenario in which closer ties are being forged between Jordan and Iraq’s restive Sunni regions in the west.

It’s also on the rumor mill that Mosul province, currently dominated by Iraq’s Sunni speaker of parliament Osama al-Nujeifi, will become a federal region under Turkish supervision. Arabs will leave Kirkuk, only Kurds and Turkmen will remain, and both Kurdistan and Turkey will share the oil revenues. Far-fetched as these ideas may be, they are exacerbating simmering sectarianism.

Paul Bremer once refered to Al-Maliki as the Saddam of Shiites, his autocratic approach to Iraqi politics is fueling the tensions of recent days. With meagre success in reducing violence during his early years as Prime Minister, Al-Maliki has in recent years strengthened his control over the government and security forces.

Now Al-Maliki is expanding his reach. Only one day after the United States’ official withdrawal from Iraq, he accused Tariq Al-Hashimi of being behind terrorist attacks in Iraq and officially dismissed Salih Mutlaq from his position as deputy Prime Minister following an interview with CNN in which Mutlaq described Al-Maliki as a new bad dictator while Saddam was a good dictator.

A source close to Tariq Al-Hashimi told me that he claims to have proof that Al-Maliki is the one who has used terrorism to strengthen his political hold, but that is holding on to that evidence for now.

Anxieties are surfacing among politicians in Iraq that Al-Maliki is trying to erase his rivals, including his Shiite allies. Al-Maliki denies the rumors saying that he supports a diverse Iraq with a wide range of parties in parliament. Time will tell if his strong hand in politics will advance a stable state or threaten it.

Kurds for now are trying to show themselves as a neutral party but, in reality, they are not. Historically, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has strong ties with Iran, including frequent visits to Iran. After the accusations against Al-Hashimi surfaced, he tried to meet with Talabani, but according to a source close to the president, Talabani refused.

Paradoxically, the other Kurdish leader, Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan region, met with Al-Hashimi and refused to surrender him to the Iraqi authorities in Baghdad. Barzani has strong ties with Turkey, including hosting Recep Tayyip in Barzani’s stronghold, the Kurdistan region’s de facto capital Erbil last year. Erdogan is the most senior Turkish official to have ever has visited Kurdistan, creating a regional game that even divides the Kurdish leaders in Iraq.

A radical political dilemma is looming in Iraq; the recent standoff appears to be just the beginning. This political dilemma might be either the warning bell of a bloody internal war with consequences unknown, or simply political jockeying in the wake of the US departure. Let’s see!

This piece has been publish with some editing first on The Majalla:
http://www.majalla.com/eng/2011/12/article55228593
This piece has published on Global Politician:
http://www.globalpolitician.com/27238-iraq-government-religion-tensions
This piece has published on Middle East Youth:
http://www.mideastyouth.com/2011/12/22/what%E2%80%99s-really-going-on-in-iraq/
This piece has republished on Dimpool - Web Based Policy Center:
http://www.dimpool.com/2011/12/what-is-really-going-on-in-iraq/
This piece has republished on Kurdistan Tribune:
http://kurdistantribune.com/2011/really-going-on-iraq/
This piece has republished on uruknet.info:
http://www.uruknet.info/?p=84158