Jan 16, 2013

Shedding Light on the Paris Killing Mystery




Abdulla Hawez 

Many scenarios have been put forward to explain the recent murders of the three Paris-based Kurdish activists (Sakîne Cansiz - Fîdan Dogan - Leyla Soylemez), all of whom were members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party,­ more commonly known by the initials PKK.  Most of these explanations were overly hasty and unconvincing, with a few exceptions.  Here I show why neither Turkish ultra-nationalist, nor a radical wing inside the PKK carried out the assassinations; but an external force that wants to derail the peace talks committed it.
The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan stated a couple hours after the incident that “it might be an internal conflict”. Mr. Erdogan’s evidence is that “the killer or killers had gotten into a building with a security door code, and had somehow managed to get into the office without breaking down the door”. In reality, there is very thin evidence to support this. According to witnesses “the building where assassination took place was not that difficult to access as claimed” says Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a journalist who traveled to Paris after the incident. “The assassination was professionally planned” he adds. It seems to be planned and done by a powerful intelligence agency. There are speculations that they opened door to killers. Killers might have followed them in.
It is true that the PKK contains various wings. It is also true that some are more radical than others. However, unlike all previous occasions, all the factions of the PKK are in agreement on the present negotiations with the Turkish government, simply because the negotiator is Abdullah Öcalan. Mr. Öcalan is the pillar that unites all the factions of the PKK and the other organizations related to it. The hunger strike that lasted more than 60 days in the fall of last year showed how powerful he is. According to a leader of the PKK who spoke with me on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the current situation, Sakîne Cansiz, the main target of the assassination, was one of the consensus-building leaders who had worked to balance relations between the PKK’s different wings. Some Turkish media outlets are claiming that Cansiz was killed because she was “pro- peace talks”, without acknowledging that all the PKK factions are presently pro- peace talks, because of the involvement of Mr. Öcalan, whom they see as their spiritual father.
For the first time, roughly all the major players in Turkish politics agreed on the necessity for negotiations between the Turkish government and the imprisoned leader of the PKK. Even the Turkish nationalists agreed that it was time to tackle the decades-long Kurdish issue: this was not because they wished to embrace the PKK, or even the current government, but simply because there are serious threats to Turkey’s unity at present; more, in fact, than at any previous time. All Turkish political factions are aware of this. The rapid developments in neighboring Syria and Iraq, especially regarding the case of the Kurds in these countries, are threatening Turkey. Furthermore, this year was very tough for the Turkish army, as hundreds of them have been killed in some of the bloodiest encounters with the PKK since 1991.  Interestingly, the Turkish ultra-nationalists, who have a lavish record of assassinating Kurdish dissidents inside Turkey, have not much that record abroad -- even when they were much stronger than now. The Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is the main opposition party and includes as its members much of the shadowy world of the notorious Turkish "deep state", has notably welcomed the negotiations.  
According to a Wikileaks cable, more than five years ago the American ambassador to Turkey, Ross Wilson, advised the Turkish government to limit the financial resources of the PKK in Europe by arresting both Reza Altun and Sakîne Cansiz. Altun had been one of the main money collectors for the PKK in Europe and was jailed in France in July 2006, and later exiled to Iraqi Kurdistan.  Cansiz, one of the three targets in the Paris incident was according to the US ambassador’s report the agent responsible for the purchase of the PKK’s weapons. She was also, according to Turkish media, one of the PKK negotiators in the Oslo talks between the Turkish intelligence agency and the PKK. She was arrested Germany on the 27th of August 2007 and held for forty days before being released by the court of Hamburg.
The main target of the Paris incident is Sakîne Cansiz; the other two were in the wrong place and in the wrong time. This scenario seems unlikely because Cansiz had supported the peace talks and disarmament of the PKK if the talks succeeded. If the Wikileaks wire proves correct, the Turkish government might have been trying to send multiple messages by ordering the hit. First, to show the PKK it’s capability to hit hard even if the negotiations were to fail. Second, to force the PKK to accept difficult concessions. Additionally, it may have had the purpose of widening the differences inside the PKK by persuading some portion of its members as well as the world at large that the Paris incident was an internal conflict over the peace talks with the Turkish government.
The most probable scenario is that an external force committed the assassinations. This scenario is the strongest amongst all scenarios for several reasons. This is the first time that both the Turkish and Kurdish sides have been seriously engaging in peace talks that might finally disentangle the Kurdish question. The only barrier that has blocked Turkey’s development has been the Kurdish issue. Solving this problem would be a big step for Turkey in terms of economy, foreign policy and joining the EU. This would automatically be a setback for Turkey’s regional rivals, especially those who have Kurdish minorities; namely Iran and Syria. Mr. Erdogan once said that terrorism has cost Turkey more than 400 billion dollars, in spite of the lost of many human resources. We can see that the region is passing through a crucial period that might witness the remapping of the political landscape. With Mr. Erdogan’s government backing the Syrian opposition, the Paris incident might be well linked with the events in the neighboring Syria. We should consider that previous week the Syrian wing of the PKK fought with the regime forces for the first time. This was a very important development as the PKK had been allied with the regime before. Iran, an important regional powerhouse, is also concerned. If the Kurds in Turkey finally find peace, the Kurds of Iran, who compromise 10% of the population, will probably be motivated to seek autonomy, especially as a growing number of them have been hanged lately. Additionally, the PKK that once was part of the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus axis, might distance itself from them if the peace talks in Turkey succeed. Therefore the peace talks contain multiple negative possibilities for Iran. Aside from all this, we should consider that Iran has a long and notorious history of foreign assassination, from the famous Kurdish politician Abdul Rahman Qasimlo to Sadiq Sharafkandi and Fazil Rasul, both Kurdish politicians. There can be more than one message if the culprit is Iran. First, to the PKK leaders, that nowhere will be safe or peaceful for you, even if you get an agreement with the Turkish government to disarm and reside in Europe. Second, to the Turkish government, that they are capable of poisoning any efforts to reconcile with adversaries on Turkish soil: not while the Turkish state supports the toppling of Iran’s most important ally, the Syrian regime.
Why Paris? For two reasons: because they wanted to target Sakîne Cansiz, the PKK’s most controversial leader, both the Turkish government and the PKK can be accused of murdering her, this way Iran would be distanced from the case. The second reason: because she was based in Paris because Turkey’s ties with France had been deteriorating over the French parliament’s recognition of the Armenian genocide, which Ankara denies.
Whoever is the perpetrator, it should be denounced. Those who carried this action out are dark forces who want bloodshed to continue, and don’t want a prosperous Turkey to emerge from a lasting peace.      

Jan 9, 2013

Iraq’s next president


Some of the leading figures of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

 Abdulla Hawez

Lately the massive demonstrations in the predominately Sunni cities in the central and north of Iraq took over the talks about who will be Talabani’s successor as the president of the republic of Iraq. According to confirmed sources, even if Talabani’s health gets better, he will not be able re-enter the political life, due to the seriousness of his health condition. Now, quite serious meetings have started between the Kurdish leadership in Erbil and Sulimania to appoint someone to replace Talabani. However, apparently, there is more than one challenge that faces Kurdish leadership, Talabani’s the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in particular to nominate someone for Iraq’s presidency. On Sunday, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan regional government (KRG), Nichervan Barzani has paid a quick visit to Tehran to discuss the matter with Iranian authorities, they have promised to back a Kurdish candidate for the position. Here are our predictions about Iraq’s next president based on information from sources close from Kurdish leadership:

Dr. Barham Ahmed Salih: Talabani’s favorite politician, and his most probable successor. He has built inclusive connections with American decision-makers, when he was serving as the PUK’s representative in Washington DC. Salih has PhD in computer engineering from the University of Liverpool. If Talabani’s health condition improves, he will be having more chance to get the position, because Talabani has always backed him. What decreases Dr. Salih’s opportunity to get the position is the strong refusal from Iran. Moreover, what reduces Dr. Salih’s opportunity further is the rebuff, even inside his party. Dr. Salih has never been loved inside the leadership council of the PUK, as he has always been appointed by direct interventions from Talabani. Also, many of the PUK leaders accuse him of being close from Masoud Barzani’s the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the historical rival of the PUK. Furthermore, the Kurdistan’s main opposition party leader, Nawsherwan Mustafa that has split from the PUK, refuses Dr. Salih’s nomination for the post. Mr. Mustafa is Dr. Salih’s personal opponent; both of them are struggling to gain more popularity in their hometown, Sulimania, the KRG’s second largest city. Despite those challenges, he has resilient chance to get the position. Even though, according to the strategic agreement between Talabani’s the PUK and Barzani’s the KDP, the post of Iraqi presidency will go to the PUK, but Masoud Barzani, the close ally of Turkey, will be having louder voice in appointing Talabani’s successor. Barzani’s hand will most likely pick Dr. Salih, as Barzani has insisted in the continuing negotiations between the two parties that have started previous week. Correspondingly, the PUK’s interim leader, Kosrat Rasul Ali, will back Dr. Salih for the position.

Dr. Najmaldin Karim: He is the most recent becoming-popular leader in the Kurdistan region. Talabani’s close friend, and one of the most experienced Kurdish leaders. Dr. Kareem, the former director of the Washington Kurdish Institute is now the governor of oil-rich city of Kirkuk, both central government of Baghdad and the KRG are disputing over the territories of this city. Dr. Karim is a neurosurgeon with American citizenship. He came back to Iraq in 2010. Since becoming the governor of Kirkuk in 2010, massive construction and building process has undertaken in the city. For those who are familiar with the city, huge development can be felt. Dr. karim is famous of holding the stick in the middle. When al-Maliki’s ties with the Turkish government were at its lowest point, Dr.Karim has received both Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in less than a month. Despite, his ties with the Americans, Dr. Karim have meanwhile strong ties with Iranians and Turks. Furthermore, he is the most consensual person inside his party and among Kurds as well.

Hero Ibrahim Ahmed: Mrs. Hero is Talabani’s spouse, and daughter of one of the most important Kurdish figures in the recent history. What rise Mrs. Hero’s star in the competition of getting the Iraq’s presidency position is the strong backing inside her party, as well as from the main opposition leader, Nawsherwan Mustafa, the historical leader of the PUK that has split from the party in 2008. Mrs. Hero has Iran’s support as well. Yet, Mrs. Hero’s appointment might shut off by mass denial from the lower members of the PUK and ordinary people of the Kurdistan region due to her notorious history regarding corruption and nepotism. In addition, many are complaining of her low leadership and communication skills.

What’s important here is that Turkey will have a big hand in appointing Iraq’s next president. After backing the demonstrations in the Sunni cities that seems to become effective, Turkey’s next target will be the presidency. Whoever becomes Iraq’s next president, it will be a lose for Iranian regime, because no one would be as loyal as Talabani, Iran’s historical ally. Nevertheless, Iranians will not give up imposing their will, but sooner or later, they will understand that their leverage isn’t as strong as before.    

Dec 28, 2012

WHY TALABANI MATTERS THE MOST?


Abdulla Hawez



Since the deterioration of President Jalal Talabani’s health on Monday night, his condition has dominated the headlines in Iraq. At stake is not only the end of a president, but also the possible end of the era of peaceful negotiations between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad.
What differs Talabani from the other politicians in Iraq is that if he dies it would shake Kurdistan’s and Iraq’s political landscape equally. The president is both Kurdistan’s and Iraq’s number one heavyweight politician, and the only one that can keep the balance both in Kurdistan internally and with the central government in Baghdad.
Together with Mustafa Barzani (who founded the Kurdistan Democratic Party – KDP – and is the father of Kurdistan’s president Masoud Barzani), Jalal Talabani’s was the driving force behind the Kurdish revolution that started in 1961. His political career started more than 65 years ago, at the age of 14.
In 1975, Talabani left the KDP and founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which became the dominant party in Kurdistan, much thanks to its armed movement that re-started the revolution in 1976.
After the Kurdish uprising against the Ba’ath regime in 1991, elections were held for Kurdistan’s newly established parliament, in which PUK and its historical rival KDP gained almost equal shares of the votes. Since 1995, there has been internal conflicts over power between these two major parties, which led to the split of the Kurdistan region into two government administrations; one in Erbil, the current capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the other in Sulimania, the KRG’s second largest city.
In 1998, an agreement between the two parties was brokered in Washington under the supervision of the then-US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. PUK and KDP agreed to govern the Kurdistan Regional Government based on a 50-50% sharing of power.

Since PUK always took part in the elections jointly with the KDP, problems occurred as the PUK lost almost half of its popular support to the change movement. What have kept the balance and stability since then have been Talabani’s statesmanship skills and the strategic agreement between PUK and KDP.
Since the split in 2008, the PUK is suffering from internal differences, where Talabani is the only guarantee for keeping PUK from disintegrating further. There is an argument whether PUK will remain after Talabani dies or leaves the political scene, with the odds not looking too good. The most likely scenario is that the majority of PUK members will join the change movement, while a few of them will join the ruling KDP. Even if PUK persists, it will become a very weak party.
What is at stake is not only PUK’s survival, but also the balance of power in Kurdistan. Talabani is maintaining that balance in many respects. First, he is the only man that can be balance Masoud Barzani as the most powerful man in Kurdistan, and he is the only one that can challenge him. Furthermore, the end of Talabani may lead to the end of power sharing in Kurdistan, at least in its current shape.
The change movement is likely to replace PUK, but the problem is that they are very critical of the KDP, which will cause difficulties for cooperating. There are two scenarios: either the KDP will accept some political reform, in which case after elections one of them accept to become the opposition, or there will be further division. The latter would also mean further division between the two major cities; Erbil and Sulimania, because Erbil is the stronghold of the KDP and Sulimania is the stronghold of the change movement.
Since becoming the president of Iraq in 2005, Talabani has upheld excellent ties with all political players in Iraq, while no one else could do so, functioning as a mediator between the religious sects.
President Talabani has been the reason of the still-not-so-bad relationship between the KRG and Baghdad. Only a couple of hours before being hospitalized, he met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to tackle the increasingly violent tensions between Kurdistan and the central government through dialogue instead of military means.
Talabani has also been the only Kurdish figure that could keep warm ties with the ruling Shiite leaders in Baghdad. He has also built strong ties with the Sunni Arab leaders, advising them to engage further in the political life. After him, the hardliners on both sides will dominate the arena. All connections between the Prime Minister al-Maliki and Kurdistan’s President Masoud Barzani have gone through Talabani.
A possible further deterioration of the already worsening ties between the KRG and Baghdad may eventually lead to the separation of Kurds from Iraq, because for Kurds, independence from Iraq is only a matter of time. Talabani has been arguing that the time hasn’t yet come for independence, while Barzani is more enthusiastic about it.
On the regional stage, he has engaged in dialogue with Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria at the same time. Iran’s parliament speaker told Prime Minister al-Maliki when he was in Baghdad last month that if the Iranians were forced to choose between him and Talabani, they would choose the latter. The president’s ties with Turkish leaders have also been excellent. He has been mediating between the Turkish government and the PKK to find a solution for the decades-long Kurdish question in Turkey.

Talabani’s death would not be the end of the world, but it would definitely be the end of a period of relative stability in both Kurdistan and Iraq. The president is a jokey and moderate person who has been a strong advocate of democracy and secularism. He has been open to criticism even inside his party. If he would leave this world or the political scene, it would be a big loss for both Kurdistan and Iraq.


This piece has first appeared on Your Middle East:
http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/abdulla-hawez-why-talabani-matters-the-most_11805

Dec 11, 2012

We need a break


Abdulla Hawez

Kurdistan's Erbil has been appointed this year to be the tourism capital of the Arab world in 2014. Kurdistan, especially its capital Erbil, has developed very rapidly in the last eight years. 


Kurds, through out the history, has lived in wars and violence confrontations. One of the major reasons has been ethnical. The other had been historically geographical; Kurdistan had been the border between two major empires, the Ottomans and Safavids, that’s why most of the wars had been mainly erupted in the Kurdish terrains. In the first half of the prior century, as the nationalist sentiment has arisen in the region, Kurdish struggle for an independent sovereign state has been continuing until nowadays. The only part of Kurdistan that could gain relatively notable achievements has been Kurds of Iraq.
Iraqi Kurdistan has a quasi-state since 1991 when a no-fly zone had been imposed under the Iraqi Kurdish areas by the United Nations. Since then, local government, and the state institutions that has been founded gradually could ran the region, even though there were international, regional and Iraqi sanctions over the region, which was quite challenging to survive, but Kurds could linger.
The key event that has changed the condition of Kurdistan and opened the doors toward it has been the liberation process in 2003 by the coalition forces led by the United States. Very rapid development with huge budget from the central government flew to Kurdistan, so that helped Kurds to develop. In less than ten years, with Kurds could keep their region peaceful and far from violence, they could achieve what could be achieved in decades. Fairly strong democratic institutions, sturdy representation of the opposition in the parliament, free media, and protecting minority rights. None of those have been done in the rest of Iraq, mainly because of insecurity and sectarian bloodshed.
Peace is the core for any development. Without peace, Kurds couldn’t achieve, what they have achieved. Iraq is a rich country with lots of natural resources that could be shared among all Iraqis. However, the country has been mentioned among worst countries in the world in many reports this year. Insecurity, which has resulted from sectarian violence and security vacuum, led the country to this track.
Kurds need more time to build up their region, and compensate centuries of suppression and tyranny that led to backwardness and ignorance, so do Iraqis.
As the two sides, Iraqi government and Kurdistan regional government are mobilizing troops in the disputed areas of Kirkuk province, both nations should reject this action. There is a huge possibility to compromise the case through dialogue, as they have never done so seriously. Now, the loudest voice is the one of radicals who prefers violence to tackle the matter. To abandon a war, the people of these areas should decide their future, not the ones of Baghdad and Erbil. To achieve this, you need to keep peace for some more years, as the development has just started in Kirkuk in the couple last years. In peace, the people of these areas can decide their future. Understandably, both government of Erbil and Baghdad want to impose their will on this issue, but the will of the people of these areas should be the core for any future compromise. Otherwise, neither the issue will be tackled, nor the country will witness peace which is needed for any development that Iraqis awaiting it from a long time.
Neither Kurds nor Arabs could benefit from the violence, as they have already experienced it in the last ten years. Wisdom is something that could appear in such circumstances. It’s the time for Iraqis to start re-building their country, and Kurds continue building up their region further. This is the only way to make the people satisfied. We need a break from wars and violence. We really do.

Abdulla can be reached through: @abdullahawez

Nov 11, 2012

60 days of Hunger Strike; so what's next?

Thousands of residents of the city of Wan take to the streets in support of Kurdish prisoners on hunger strike in Turkish jails. 

Abdulla Hawez*

The recent Hunger Strike by Kurdish prisoners in Turkey has passed 61 days today. The Hunger Strike has first started on 12th of September with Faysal Yaldız, an imprisoned member of parliament of BDP, has announced an open hunger strike. Currently, the number of Hunger Strikers has passed 688 Kurdish prisoners in 76 different jails in all over Turkey. The Hunger Strikers have two demands. First, leasing the imprisoned leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, see his lawyers, which he hasn't seen them for more than 400 days. The second demand is allowing the prisoners to defend themselves in the courts in their mother tongue language; this means permitting Kurds to defend themselves in the courts in Kurdish.
Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has earlier declined to accept the strikers' demands, especially the one that related to Öcalan.
It would be quite firm for Turkish Prime Minister to take the two demands for more than a reason. Because of the recent bloody attacks of PKK, Turkish public opinion is not in the side of the strikers. Moreover, the second demand has been in the AK Party's agenda to be done. Now, the AK Party sees that PKK wants to exploit this demand to gain more support; while this demand has been one of various cases that AK Party has tried to boost as part of its opening policy toward Kurds. AK Party assumes that if they accepted the Hunger Strikers demands that would be a victory for PKK, besides other demands will be followed. AK Party knows well that PKK is using this strike as a card to gain more support in the southeastern region of Turkey that is mostly populated by Kurds. Furthermore, the strike hasn't attracted enough attention from the main stream media, so that will make the case less likely to be effective enough to achieve its goals.  
Aside from being pragmatic, in cases such as this hunger strike, Turkish Prime Minister is a stubborn guy that may understand the strike as personal; that's why I don't think he will be responding to the strikers even if they die of hunger. We have many other cases of dying in the Turkish prisons of Hunger starting from 1981 to 1982 to 1996 to 2000 when 30 pensioners died. However, dissimilar than the earlier Hunger Strikes, any dead case may be following by a mass rage in the Kurdish areas as the region is passing through an awakening and Turkey itself is very much involved in the revolution in the neighboring Syria that if the government not going to move faster to boost the right of Kurds it may witness same mass insurgency in its very own lands.      

* Journalist based in the Iraqi Kurdistan

Aug 28, 2012

Rationality in Turkish Politics


Abdulla Hawez*

What's threatening politics worldwide, nowadays, are irrational actors; minimizing the picture to a specific state will give a better result. Turkey, with one of the most sophisticated political systems in the region, is suffering from the irrational actors that are threatening the future of politics in this regional powerhouse. Turkish National Movement or MHP is the direct target of this piece. MHP, which is denying the existence of Kurdish question in Turkey and doesn't recognize KRG as a constitutionally legal zone in Iraq, also many times threatened erasing Kurds. Hence, you can't negotiate with such political entity that is not ready to change its policies that has been proved to be wrong. Furthermore, while Devlet Bahçeli, chief of MHP asks AKP government to erase Kandil from the map and held Turkish flags there, he can't even get a visa to go to the multi-ethnical city of Kirkuk. 
Morality is equality important in Politics to remain people's trust on it. However, MHP and most of the other nationalist bodies in Turkey and elsewhere suffer from lack of morality. Whereas, Devlet Bahçeli, chief of MHP tried to visit oil-rich city of Kirkuk through Iraqi province of Musil to avoid KRG stamp on his passport, according to Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce up to 70% of the Turkish investments in KRG zone comes from the companies that have links with MHP; Turkish investments are KRG's economic backbone and the sources of prosperity as it makes up to 80% of the 20 billion foreign investments in the region.
If AKP wants to keep brotherhood between its fellow diverse citizens, it should work on a legislation in the parliament to ban fascist entities that are threatening the unity of the country and has no less danger than PKK.

* Freelance journalist based in the KRG. 

Aug 9, 2012

Turkey warns Assad that he must keep Kurds in check, or risk intervention

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said earlier this week that if the Syrian Kurds use their base to launch a terror campaign on Turkey, intervention in Syria would be 'our most natural right.'


President Bashar al-Assad, facing a growing rebel presence in Aleppo, Syria’s largest city and its commercial hub, has turned control of parts of northern Syria over to militant Kurds who Turkey has long branded as terrorists, prompting concern that Istanbul might see the development as a reason to send troops across its border with Syria.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in comments late on July 25, said that Turkey would not accept an entity in northern Syria governed by the Iraq-based Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which has long waged a guerrilla war against Turkey, and its Syrian affiliate, the Democratic Union Party.

He said the two groups had built a “structure in northern Syria” that for Turkey means “a structure of terror.”

“It is impossible for us to look favorably at such a structure,” he said in an interview with a private television channel.

He warned that if Syrian Kurdish militants mount a terror operation or some other form of cross-border provocation against Turkey, “then intervening would be our most natural right.”

The prospect of a PKK-dominated zone in northern Syria appears to be an unintended consequence of the civil war now raging between Assad and rebels of the Free Syrian Army, who are Arab Sunni Muslims who’ve been fighting, with US and other nations’ backing, to topple Assad’s government.

Assad withdrew forces last week from six predominantly Kurdish towns and handed control to the Kurdish militants in what appears to be an effort to bolster his defenses at Aleppo, which became the scene of sustained fighting last week for the first time since the anti-Assad uprising began more than 16 months ago. Assad also reportedly has pulled forces from the Idlib region of northeastern Syria and moved them to Aleppo in preparation for what some say will be a pitched battle for the city.

Tens of thousands of residents of Aleppo have fled in anticipation of the battle. Reports from anti-Assad groups indicate that thousands of pro-Assad and rebel fighters are converging on the city, which many believe Assad must hold if he is to maintain control of the country.

The developments in Kurdish areas, however, suggest that no matter who wins the civil war, the fighting is shifting the politics of Syria and its neighbors in ways that cannot be predicted.

The establishment of a Kurdish-ruled zone inside Syria has long been a goal of the Kurdish population. Leaders of the anti-Assad opposition have said in recent days that they would oppose such a zone, and Kurdish fighters have said they would not allow the Free Syrian Army to operate in the region.

Officially, the Democratic Union Party is sharing power over six towns – Kobane, Derek, Amude, Efrin, Sari Kani and Girke Lege – with the Kurdish National Council, an umbrella organization of anti-Assad Kurdish groups. In fact, the Kurdish militants have raised the PKK flag over public buildings or have used force to haul down their rivals’ flag, Kurdish news media in the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil reported Thursday.

The PKK affiliate also controls stretches of the Syrian border, including a key crossing into territory of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the increasingly autonomous province in neighboring Iraq. 

The stakes are enormous in this otherwise obscure region. Turkey fears that a Syrian Kurdish state run by the PKK will radicalize its own restive Kurds, who comprise 12 million, or one-sixth, of its 74 million population. Hundreds, possibly thousands, of Syrian Kurdish fighters have taken part in PKK raids inside Turkey over the years.

The development also could worsen the political situation inside Iraq, where the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government maintains chilly relations with the central government in Baghdad, but ever closer relations with Turkey. Iraq’s prime minister, Nouri al Maliki, a Shiite Muslim, is a supporter of Assad, whose Alawite religious sect is an offshoot of Shiite Islam. Baghdad and the Kurdish government disagree over a range of other issues, from oil export policy to who should govern cities where the population is split between Kurds and Arabs. 

Kurdistan’s president, Massoud Barzani, tried to head off a Democratic Union Party takeover several weeks ago, when he hosted the 16 or so groups comprising the Kurdish National Council, together with the Syrian National Council, also an umbrella body, at a meeting in Erbil. Many now believe the arrangement he brokered actually paved the way for the PKK takeover.

In a move some analysts said might be intended to undercut PKK influence in Syria, Barzani announced Sunday that the Kurdistan Regional Government would dispatch back to Syria, allegedly to fill a security vacuum, some of the Kurdish Syrian soldiers who’ve deserted into Iraq to escape the civil war. Kurdish media reported that some 650 Kurdish soldiers already returned to Syria last week, and there were suggestions that the Kurdistan Regional Government’s own military, the peshmerga, is considering entering Syria as well. That move is opposed by the PKK, local Kurdish newspapers have reported.

“Peshmerga forces are our brothers and relatives and we do not have any problems with them,” Salih Muslim, a Democratic Union Party leader, told the English-language daily Rudaw. “But Syrian Kurdistan does not need assistance from the peshmerga forces at this point and if the need arises we will ask for their help.” 

Assad forces still control Qamishli, a city of well over 400,000 and the unofficial capital of the predominantly Kurdish northern region. But a decision by Assad to allow the PKK to take over there as well could move Barzani to intervene on Turkey’s behalf. Such a development could spark a reaction in Baghdad, whose authority over Iraq’s international relations would be directly challenged by a peshmerga move into Syria.

Turkey has shown little hesitance to invade neighboring countries in response to PKK attacks on Turkish targets. In October, Turkish aircraft and troops crossed into Iraq to hunt down PKK guerrillas who’d killed 29 members of Turkey’s security forces and five civilians in a series of raids in southern Turkey.

By Roy Gutman, McClatchy Newspapers /
McClatchy special correspondent Abdulla Hawaz contributed from Erbil, Iraq.

This report has been published on The Christian Science Monitor: