Challenges mar grand Kurdish conference

For the first time in modern history, in a significant opportunity to boost their unity, Kurds are planning to draft a strategy with a grand conference, but political rivalry and divisions among the parties as well as concerns of regional powers have largely dashed hopes that it will yield intended results.

The pan-Kurdish conference was initially scheduled to take place in Arbil, capital of Iraq's Kurdistan, and slated for Aug. 20, but it was postponed to September due to what the organizers called “some technical problems.”
The conference will be the first of its kind in the history of Kurds. The first failed attempt to hold a grand Kurdish conference goes back to 1978, when the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) wanted to convene all representatives of Kurds in the Lebanese capital, Beirut.
The efforts to hold this current national conference of all Kurds, mainly organized by three leading Kurdish forces -- the PKK, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) -- have been under way for months. In a meeting on July 22 in Arbil, led by President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Massoud Barzani, representatives of the Kurdish parties from the four countries, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, officially agreed on the initiation of the Kurdish national conference. During the meeting, the participants agreed to establish a committee to handle the preparation of the conference. The committee consisted of 21 members: six from Turkey's Kurds, five each from Iraq and Iran, four from Syria and one representative of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Around 600 politicians, NGO activists and guests are expected to attend the three-day conference.
The conference is expected to be led by Barzani because he is the most prominent and powerful leader among the attendees. Some accuse Barzani of deliberately rejecting the conference many times before but accepting it now so that he could lead the Kurdish gathering alone astwo other powerful Kurdish leaders are absent: PKK leader AbdullahÖcalan in jail and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani in bed in a hospital in Germany.
The main aim of the conference is to unite Kurds at a time when they are more divided than ever over controlling Syrian territories predominantly populated by Kurds and the controversial ties of some forces with regional powerhouses: the PKK with Iran and the KDP with Turkey.
Although Kurds have pinned much hope for this conference, expected to gather representatives of all Kurds in the region, there is only little hope that the conference will yield substantial success in terms of achieving its stated goals. It is true that Kurdish political parties for the first time in modern history could agree to hold this conference, but it is also a fact that these forces also stand more divided than ever before.
Only days before the conference, a fresh wrangle started between the PKK and the KDP over Syria's Kurdish areas that are currently controlled by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Syrian offshoot of the PKK. Newly elected co-chair of the PKK, Cemil Bayık, accused Barzani's KDP of conspiring against Syrian Kurds by closing the border with Syria and working with the anti-Kurdish forces, namely Turkey, in Syria against the PYD. In return, the KDP accused the PYD of building a dictatorship in Syria by unilaterally controlling Kurdish areas and not cooperating with other Kurdish parties that are mostly affiliated with the KDP and hence destroying all efforts to unite Kurds.
This division between the KDP and the PKK, the two major Kurdish parties, is only part of a bigger picture. The Kurdish parties in Iraq are seriously at odds because of mistrust between each other. The Iraqi Kurdish opposition bloc (the Gorran movement, Kurdistan Islamic Union and Islamic group), for instance, boycotted a gathering that would draft the agenda of the conference at the beginning, only to be convinced to participate later.
In Iran and Syria, internal political debates are eating away at the strong representation of Kurds in these countries at the planned conference. In Iran, the Kurds are in dispute over the representation in the organizing committee. The traditional Kurdish forces excluded their main rival, the Party of Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), the Iranian offshoot of the PKK. In Syria, an agreement between the Kurdish political parties to cooperate hasn't begun to have an impact until now. Many Kurdish public figures, including the leaders of the Kurdish political parties in Syria, warned against impending civil war between Kurds in Syria if the PYD doesn't stop its unilateral steps.
While the Kurdish parties are deeply divided, the regional powers are also in contact with the Iraqi Kurdish officials to make sure the conference doesn't threaten the unity of their countries. Turkey, which has the highest Kurdish population, seemed to be relaxed because only days after the announcement of the conference, the KRG prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani, rushed to Ankara to comfort Turkish officials. Only after visiting Ankara, Barzani flew to Tehran to allay Iranian concerns about the conference. His trip to Tehran, however, was portrayed as if he traveled there to participate in the inauguration ceremony of the new president of Iran, Hassan Rouhani. As the two countries and other international players are expected to attend the conference, many activists and political parties refuse foreign participation in the conference because it will further reduce the chance of any serious agreement between the political parties. Iranian Kurdish political parties in particular harshly reject participation of Iranian officials and say itwould jeopardize all efforts to make the conference successful.
Aside from all these political factors, the Kurdish question in each of the four countries that have Kurdish minorities has evolved differently in the last century; this is why a common Kurdish strategy doesn't seem to work.
The negative atmosphere surrounding the pan-Kurdish conference pushed many to consider it as only a symbolic gathering. The conference, however, is significant because it's the first time in modern history that representatives of all Kurds around the world have agreed to gather in one hall.
Even if it fails to set up a national Kurdish strategy, the conference remains an important step forward.

This article first appeared on Today's Zaman - here:

http://www.todayszaman.com/blog-323880-challenges-mar-grand-kurdish-conference.html

Iraqi Kurdistan: from boom to doom?

Only a decade ago, Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), was a dirty, dusty and isolated town. During the summer months, people would refer to it as the “gateway to hell.” But ten years later, Erbil’s image has seen a startling change, and many of Iraq’s 28 millions would now consider the city a heavenly location to spend their summer vacation.

With a series of massive construction projects underway, a booming economy driven by the region’s enormous oil and gas reserves, and a strong business partner in former enemy Turkey, the city looks set to shine in the coming years. Politically, with the Middle East becoming increasingly polarised in the wake of the on-going sectarian civil war in Syria, the KRG has managed to maintain good ties with Iran, Turkey, Israel and the West all at the same time. Given all this, one could reasonably conclude that Kurdistan is booming. But is Iraqi Kurdistan facing an upcoming fall?

Everything that has so far been achieved is as fragile as the region’s uncertain political future. The relationship between the KRG and Iraq’s federal government changes on a daily basis due to the deep levels of mistrust between the two parties, and the interference of both regional and international powers.

Although the Kurds have complained that the dictatorial tendencies of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki threaten the unity of Iraq, they recently welcomed him on a visit to the region with a lavish ceremony at Erbil International Airport. Nevertheless, it seems certain that relations between the KRG and Baghdad will remain unsettled for the foreseeable future. Indeed, due to the accumulation of a number of serious and unsolved issues, a likely outcome to the relationship is divorce. But any development of this kind will need a green light from regional and international players, in particular from Turkey, as the KRG has become increasingly dependent economically on its northern neighbour.

While the central government in Baghdad is building stronger ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the KRG has drawn closer to Ankara. Since 2007, cooperation over economic and energy issues has helped to redefine a once combustible relationship. Turkey has become Kurdistan’s top economic partner and, what is more, has signed a strategic energy pact that could remap the region both politically and economically.

The new oil pipelines that connect Kurdistan with Turkey were built without Baghdad’s prior approval, and this has helped to exacerbate the already unsteady relationship between the KRG and Turkey on the one hand, and the Iraqi government on the other. The liberal-oriented Turkish daily Taraf recently reported that Ankara had quietly signed an oil partnership deal with the KRG, despite the objections of the Baghdad government. According to the newspaper, the deal is proof that Turkey is elevating its cooperation with Iraqi Kurdistan to the level of an international partnership, meaning that the KRG will eventually be able to gain its economic independence from Baghdad.

According to Falah Mustafa, the KRG’s Minister of Foreign Relations, Turkey represents the KRG’s “gate to the world.” This may well be true, but it is worth considering for a moment the nature of the rapidly developing relationship between the two. Turkey has become the KRG’s biggest economic partner, accounting for 70% of all foreign investment in the region, and has recently constructed a series of oil pipelines, despite the objections of the Iraqi federal government. The result is that, while the KRG has been able to reduce its dependence on Baghdad, it has simultaneously become overly reliant on Turkey.
In addition, while it has been busy improving its ties with the Turkish government, the KRG seems to have forgotten Iran’s importance to regional politics and security. The Islamic Republic is the most influential foreign power in Iraq, and its ties to the country’s Shi’a population go well beyond friendship. While the world continues to take note of Turkey’s economic and political dominance in the Middle East, Iran has been silently building a semi-imperial Shi’a region that includes Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. In Syria, where the sectarian civil war divides regional powers into two opposing blocs, Kurds are unquestioningly – and unwisely – backing the mainly Sunni opposition.
It is important to think about all of this rationally. The KRG can never hope to be fully independent, due to its landlocked geography, and should always keep good ties with at least one or more of the neighbouring countries. Moreover, some of the powers that will play a crucial role in the future of the Middle East are Turkey, Iran, and the United States, and none of these players can hope to dominate the region on their own, so the KRG should keep ties with at least two of them. More crucially, the Middle East is witnessing a very decisive period in its history. New states are expected to emerge in the wake of recent developments in the wider region, and for the Kurds the time has come to translate their decades-long struggle for statehood into a reality.
But the Kurds will not be able to make this happen by being overly dependent on just one country while abandoning the others, just because there is deep mistrust between these countries’ governments and their Kurdish minorities. In Turkey, while a peace process to solve the Kurdish question has been initiated by the government, a lasting solution is still far off on the horizon. If the peace process fails, the new ties between Ankara and Erbil will become severely strained.
The KRG’s problem is that it is too ambitious given its size, history and capabilities. It is a small region that wants to play big games. If Iraqi Kurdistan is to continue its current boom period, the KRG should first balance its relations with both Turkey and Iran, and avoid becoming overly reliant on either. It should also stay away from backing either regime or opposition in Syria, and should encourage Syria’s Kurdish parties to remain neutral. In other words, the KRG should avoid taking sides in Syria as otherwise it will automatically commit itself to one of the two regional blocs, led by Iran and Turkey respectively. Most importantly, consolidating democracy internally remains the most important factor to ensure the KRG remains strong, and continues to attract western support. Otherwise, for the Kurds, the boom may very well turn to doom.

This article first appeared on Your Middle East - here:
http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/features/iraqi-kurdistan-from-boom-to-doom_17018

Iraq: politics through conflict

Iraqi army personnel and people gather at the site of a car bomb attack in the city of Kut, 150 km (93 miles) southeast of Baghdad on July 29, 2013. (Photo: Reuters)

The latest bombings in Baghdad and other cities show how politics in Iraq has become increasingly nasty. Although Iraq has never been a fully stable country since its foundation in 1923, it had never reached a level to be called a conflict.
After the American invasion in 2003, some political players had driven the country toward a devastating sectarian conflict; undoubtedly, the Americans have an important role in strengthening the sectarian identity since the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003. Sunnis that were ruling Iraq for decades felt neglected because Iraq's majority Shiites started to consolidate their power.
So Sunnis started the armed struggle to get back their glory, or at least poison political life; this struggle was based on revenge. Later, when the first elections took place in 2005, Sunnis boycotted it; they felt yet more isolated. Then, when their anger peaked, they bombed the Shiite icon, the AlImamayn Al-Askariyyan mosque, in Diyala province. By then, the Shiites decided to seek revenge as the ordinary Shiites' anger peaked as well.
From 2006, a bloody sectarian conflict has torn the whole country. The prospect of a solution seemed murky, and when the politicians became disenchanted, Iraq returned to medieval times. A fragile deal was signed between power-thirsty politicians as the security got better. But the tutelage of regional and international powers, and the sectarian-oriented beliefs of the Iraqi politicians may drive the country to another, worse sectarian conflict whose outcome this time might be far more disastrous. The already crisis-prone Iraqi political system is run by politicians who are implementing external agendas; when it is needed, they are shaking the political life with bombings and turning it into a religious and ethnic conflict. The recent bombings in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq are entirely linked to the political standoff between Shiite Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and his Sunni and Shiite rivals. The bombings in Iraq have become a trump card that all politicians are using as the easiest way to get what they want or at least not to allow other parties to set their political agenda. 

This article first appeared on Today's Zaman - here:
http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=322235

Erbil -- the next Dubai or İstanbul?

Erbil, one of the most ancient cities in the world, around 50 miles east of Musil, is the regional capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq. Erbil, with its 1.5 million population, is one of the most rapidly growing cities in the Middle East in both its economy and the tourism sector with investments exceeding 14 billion dollars so far in 2013. Most of these investments come from neighboring Turkey, the KRG's biggest economic partner.   

Now, in the KRG, there are debates about which city Erbil should consider as a role model as Masoud Barzani, president of the autonomous region, more than a few times mentioned Dubai as a role model for the city. “We will make Erbil like Dubai,” Barzani stated. However, one who knows the nature of both cities can easily realize how far this dream is from being reached for various reasons. In addition, apart from the skyscrapers, there is nothing much to take from Dubai.
İstanbul, now in the global spotlight as a center of tension because of the Gezi park protests, could be a good role model for Erbil, for various reasons. Here are some: When we wake up in the morning, we will wash our face with Turkish soap, then we will eat Turkish cheeses with some Turkish breads. After that, we will change our clothes, wearing a Turkish-brand shirt and jeans. Then while going to work, along the road we will see all these new Turkish investment projects. After arriving at our office, we will sit on a Turkish chair surrounded by other Turkish furniture. Later, we will drink Turkish coffee. Then, we will do our job with Turkish-made pen and paper in hand. After some hard work, we will finish our job and go to a Turkish restaurant with our friends to have lunch; there we will be delighted by hearing some Turkish music. Then, home again after a tiring day, we will have a dip in a relaxing Turkish bath. After that, we will sit on a Turkish sofa and listen to news on a Turkish-brand television. At night, we will go to a Turkish shopping center with our family and buy some Turkish products. Later, after finishing our shopping, we will go home to a building made with Turkish tools by Turkish workers. Then, we'll feel sleepy and go to our Turkish-made bed, then have a sweet dream about going to İstanbul for a vacation.
İstanbul is a success story, mixing modernity with its rich authenticity, much ahead of Dubai in all sectors. While Erbil is already becoming the next İstanbul, why it should look to Dubai as a success story?

This article first appeared on Today's Zaman - here:
http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=318004&columnistId=145

Sunni insurgency: Iraq's dissolution and beyond

Iraq's political dilemma has deepened yet further with the bloody clash between the Iraqi Shiite-dominated army and the Sunni protesters in Hawija in southern Kirkuk, that later spread to elsewhere in the Sunni region. However, that was expected. Inspired by the Syrian revolution, demonstrations in the predominately Sunni cities in central and northern Iraq started almost five months ago against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's anti-Sunni policies. They have made seven demands, but the demands have fallen on deaf ears. Now chaos and rebellion spreads in many of the Sunni cities in the northern and central parts of Iraq. Does that signal the beginning of Iraq's dissolution? Or does it suggest the beginning of a sectarian conflict beyond Iraq?              

The Sunni rebellion against the Shiite-led government of Mr. Maliki that was sparked last week has multi-dimensional consequences for the future of Iraq, the Syrian revolution, regional alliances and the sectarian conflict.          
It can be said that the demonstrations in the Sunni cities that began in early January were the first step toward a Sunni region in the central and northern Iraq. But the clashes between demonstrators and the Iraqi army could be considered a bolder step from Sunnis toward forming their region after becoming hopeless about Mr. Maliki's policies that have especially targeted Sunnis, including their leaders. Now, chaos and rebellion are all over the Sunni cities including Musil, Sunnis' biggest city. Sunni fighters are mainly tribal members are trying to establish a de facto Sunni region. Then that means the three-region solution is slowly becoming real, which would seemingly lead to the dissolution of a country called Iraq that has never been fully integrated.          
Here, eyes cannot be blind to the regional powers' role in what's happening in the Sunni cities. A report leaked by Kurdish media in northern Iraq shows that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), in line with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is pushing on Sunnis to seize Mr. Maliki in Baghdad and later topple him. Some other reports suggest that Sunni regional powers are pushing Sunnis to build their own region to help the Syrian opposition to attack from Iraq, because most of Iraq's border with Syria is from Anbar and Musil, which are Sunni cities. This is also because they think Mr. Maliki cannot be toppled without overthrowing the Syrian dictator.          
Recent developments in the Sunni region of Iraq have a strong linkage with the Syrian revolution. Protest in the Sunni region first started in Anbar; this city is neighbor to the Syrian city of Dir al-Zur, one of the most anti-Assad cities in Syria. So, the demonstration culture has crossed from the Syrian border to Iraq. If one observes, it can easily be found that the demonstrations that have now developed into armed rebellion have been organized and run just like Syria's.          
What matters most here is the sectarian image that the clash between protesters and the Iraqi government has; that signals another round of sectarian conflict, but what is different this time is that it's very likely to cross the border and engulf the whole region, as we already have it in neighboring Syria.          
To avoid the worst scenario, regional powerhouses, especially Iran and Turkey, should do more to ease the tension and push both sides to stop the violence. Also both Sunni protesters and Mr. Maliki should give up on some of their stubbornness and compromise. However, if Sunnis, like Kurds, want to have their own state, they should be allowed to do so: After all, no one should be forced to live in a state that is already suffering from instability; otherwise, the oblivion will become despair.

This article first appeared on Today's Zaman - here:
http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=313896&columnistId=145

Turkey's KRG policy: Is it a healthy one?

KRG President Massoud Barzani (L) greets Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the AK Party congress. (Photo: AA, Kayhan Özer)

The relations between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq are shining nowadays, thanks to economic cooperation and Turkish investment in flourishing cities of the KRG. The energy partnership is expected to boost the ties between the two parties still further. But the Turkish government's political relationship with leaders of northern Iraq seems to be more personal than with the region's authorities as a whole; that's why it lowers the expectations for a long and sustainable relationship between Ankara and the KRG. To avoid that, Turkey should change its policy toward the KRG to a more comprehensive one that embraces all parties of the region.

The ties between Turkey and the KRG have a young history, starting just three years ago. But they have been improving very rapidly. However the relations have mostly remained only with Massoud Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani's Kurdistan Democracy Party (KDP), which controls less than half of the Kurdish region. However, Turkey's relationship with the other parties is very limited. Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls the other part of the KRG, is closer to Iran, and makes up 50 percent of the cabinet. Also, the places that are under the PUK's control have more oil and natural gas than those under the KDP's control, and natural resources are one of the main factors driving the relations between the two parties. This is why many inside the region think that relations between Turkey and the KRG are more personal than the ones between the two national governments. Turkey should seek stronger ties with the PUK because without them, she cannot build an energy partnership with the KRG. Even though Turkey and the PUK already have ties and a high delegation from the PUK visited Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last month, these ties are still far weaker compared with the ones with the KDP.

Not only that, if Turkey wants a sustainable partnership with the KRG, it should expand its ties to include the opposition as well, especially the main opposition Gorran movement. The Gorran Movement for Change, which holds 23 percent of the Kurdish parliament, is expected to perform better in the upcoming election, anticipated to be held in August. Gorran is particularly expecting to win in the PUK-held oil-rich territories, which should cause concern for Turkey. Last year, the Turkish government invited Nawsherwan Mustafa, leader of the Gorran movement, to visit Ankara, but that has never happened. While Gorran's relationship with Iran is well established, this could change because this movement is a liberal force; it has no ideological connection to Iran, only shared interests. There is also a possibility that both the PUK and Gorran will make a coalition government without the KDP. Turkey's relations with the KRG will decline at the expense of Iran's because its ally, the KDP, will no longer be the governing party.

Given the fact that Turkey supports democratic change in the region, it should also do the same in the KRG, which suffers from weak democratic institutions and corruption. It should press the ruling parties to make some reforms to consolidate democracy and human rights. If Turkey does those things, then it can secure the supply for its energy-hungry economy with the KRG's huge amount of oil and natural gas.

This article first appeared on Today's Zaman - here:
http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=312083

Iraqi Kurds welcome Öcalan’s message

A wave of reactions, mostly positive, followed Abdullah Öcalan’s call for cease-fire and withdrawal of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters from Turkish territories to northern Iraq, which also raised hope for ultimate peace in Turkey’s Southeast.

Kurdish administrations in northern Iraq that enjoy strong alliance with Turkey welcomed Öcalan’s message. Massoud Barzani, the president of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, welcomed the message in a statement and showed his support for it. “This is what we have been calling for for a long time: the settlement of the Kurdish issue through political means not military ones,” Barzani said in the statement. The Kurdish president added, “Peace talks should be considered as a strategic process, not as a tactical or a temporary one.”

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) also sees Öcalan’s message as a positive one. “The KRG welcomes and supports any step from both Kurds and the Turkish government to solve the Kurdish issue through peaceful and political means,” it said in a statement, also calling on both sides not to let anyone sabotage this peace process. 

Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has also shown its support for the message, saying, “We hope Turkey’s new constitution will give equal rights to Turkey’s all ethnic groups.” The PUK’s statement also hoped for an agreement between Turkey’s AKP and the PKK in Turkish parliament.

The main opposition parties in the KRG also supported the message. Nawshirwan Mustafa, leader of the Gorran Movement for Change, an opposition group in the KRG, was among the crowd in Diyarbakır on March 21 when Öcalan’s message was read out. The Kurdistan Islamic Union, another opposition party that is considered to be ideologically close to the AKP, also showed its full support for the message, saying, “We hope everyone sees this message as a turning point in solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey.” The statement also thanked both AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkish President Abdullah Gül that are “engineers of the peace talks.”

Many Kurdish intellectuals and influential figures also welcomed the message and considered it an important change in Abdullah Öcalan’s and PKK’s mentality.

Meanwhile some ultra-nationalist Kurds especially those living in Europe condemned the message and accused Öcalan for betraying the Kurdish struggle for independence.

Published here earlier:
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